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Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena
Power, and Judicial Review: Three Branches,
Three Powers, and Some Relationships
Rex E. Lee*
In United States v. Nixon, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the existence of the President's right under appropriate circumstances to withhold certain kinds of information from
coordinate branches of government.* The Court held that this
right, which bears the label executive privilege, is based on separation of powers. One year later, in Eastland u. United States
Servicemen's Fund,3 the Court held that the issuance and enforcement of congressional subpoenas are protected under the
speech or debate ~ l a u s e . ~
A case now pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T),5raises additional important issues concerning executive privilege, congressional investigative power, and the broader separation of powers context
out of which these issues arise. Described by the court of appeals
as presenting "nerve-center constitutional q~estions,"~
the case
brings squarely into confrontation for the first time in history
three potent prerogatives of our three branches of government:
* Dean and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.A., 1960, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1963, University of Chicago. Assistant
United States Attorney General, May 1975-January 1977. Dean Lee was personally involved in the AT&T case, and argued the case before the district court and the court of
appeals. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Department
of Justice during the Ford administration.
The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Allen D. Butler, a recent graduate of the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2. Id. at 706-07. In Nixon the Court held that, under the circumstances of the case,
the President was obligated to comply with a judicial subpoena, because the President
raised only generalized claims of confidentiality, as contrasted with the judiciary's specific
need for the information in a criminal proceeding. While congressional subpoenas were
not directly involved in Nixon, the fair inference to be drawn from the opinion is that
executive privilege has applicability to attetnpts by either Congress or the courts to obtain
information.
3. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
4. See notes 43-58 and accompanying text infra.
5. The court of appeals has issued two opinions in the case. The first is reported a t
551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976); and the second, at 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6. 551 F.2d at 394.
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Congress' investigatory (subpoena) power, executive privilege
exercised to protect foreign intelligence secrets, and judicial review.
Section I of this Article briefly examines that AT&T case.
Subsequent sections will explore some of the issues that it raises.
Section II will discuss the applicability of the speech or debate
clause to congressional investigations and the scope of executive
privilege when the information a t issue is not in the government's
possession. Secton III will explore the possible procedural avenues by which an executive privilege-congressional subpoena confrontation might arise, including the constitutional impediments
to bringing such confrontations before the courts. Section IV
deals with the constitutional authority of the courts to resolve
these conflicts, and Section V examines the possible standards
appropriate for their resolution.

A.

History of the Controversy

For several decades, the United States has engaged in warrantless electronic surveillance (wiretapping) to protect national
security interests.' Such surveillance is initiated only after ap7. There is no authorizing statute for such surveillance. Its assumed legal basis is an
inherent power in the President derived from his responsibilities as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces, his responsibilities in the area of foreign relations, and his duty under
article 11, § 1 of the Constitution to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States." The Supreme Court held in United States v. United States District Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), that the President lacks such power at least insofar as
domestic threats to national security are concerned. The Keith opinion left open the issue
of inherent Presidential power to protect national security from foreign threats, including
foreign powers, foreign agents, and agents of foreign powers. Id. at 308, 321-22. See also
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (held illegal a warrantless surveillance
imposed on the Jewish Defense League whose activities were directed against foreign
powers, but which is not itself a foreign power).
Further detail on the procedures involved in instituting such a surveillance is contained in United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454,456 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
The lack of statutory authority for these foreign intelligence surveillances has been a
source of concern for the Attorney General. To alleviate this problem, S. 3197,94th Cong.,
2d Sess., was proposed in 1976 with the support of the Ford administration, particularly
Attorney General Levi. The bill was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee and by the Senate Committee on Intelligence, but died in the Senate at the close of
the 94th Congress. Currently, the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978, S. 1566, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., has been reported favorably by the same committees that reported S. 3197 during
the 94th Congress. S. REP.NO. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1978).
S. 3197 recognized the possible existence of inherent Presidential authority, in addition to that authorized by the bill. The current bill, by contrast, specifies that its provisions constitute the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance as defined . . . may
be conducted." S. 1566, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 2511(2) (1978).
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proval by the Attorney General, and is effected by the government leasing a telephone line which runs from the telephone of
the surveillance target to an FBI monitoring station. Prior to
1969, the arrangements for these leased lines were handled
rally.^ Since then, however, all leased line arrangements have
been memorialized by a "leased line letter," sometimes called a
"national security request letter." This is a single-paragraph form
letter identifying the points "from" and "to" which service is to
be leased. It states that the service is to effect a foreign intelligence surveillance authorized in writing by the Attorney General,
and cautions that the existence of the letter should not be disclosed lest the investigation be impeded.' These leased line letters
have never been classified. The persons who handle them within
the AT&Taffiliate companies are all AT&T employees who have
not undergone any formal governmental clearance procedure.
The security afforded the letters has been described, however, as
8. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d a t 388 n.5.
9. The leased line letter form is as follows:
Date
Addressee
Dear Mr.
In connection with an investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, under its lawful and established jurisdiction, it is requested
that you furnish to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a t the usual commercial
rates, the facilities or services set out below. This request is made upon the
specific written authorization of the Attorney General of the United States as a
necessary investigative technique under the powers of the President to protect
the national security against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a
foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national security information against
foreign intelligence activities, in connection with an investigation of organizations or individuals suspected to be agents of or acting in collaboration with a
foreign power. Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.
It is requested that private line facilities be furnished as follows:
From:
To:
You are not to disclose the existence of this request. Any such disclosure
could obstruct and impede the investigation.
Very truly yours,
Clarence M. Kelley,
Director
Joint Appendix a t 48, United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
The "from" portion of the form is followed by information identifying the surveillance
target by telephone number, address, telephone pole or line number, or other more technical information from which the telephone company can identify the telephone to be
tapped.
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involving "the strictest security safeguards."1°
On June 22, 1976, pursuant to its investigation into possible
governmental abuse of section 605 of the Communications Act,ll
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce issued a subpoena directing AT&T to deliver to that committee's
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations four categories of
documents.12The first category consisted of the leased line letters
10. Id. at 44. AT&T security safeguards were described by Robert L. Keuch, deputy
assistant to the Attorney General, as follows:
Upon information and belief AT&T receives and maintains all leased line
letters under the strictest security safeguards. In the normal case not more than
one individual per company is authorized to receive and have access to the
request letter. In all cases the leased line letters are maintained within the
security section of the corporation. Under company policies, members of
AT&T's security organization are employed only after a full field investigation
of the general nature utilized by the FBI in processing security clearances.
Finally, all leased line letters are separately maintained in safes or secure compartments as would be required for classified information held by the Executive
Branch. In all the years in which AT&T has performed this function, there is
no evidence that the security of the leased line evidence has ever been compromised.
Id.
11. 47 U.S.C. 5 605 (1970). Section 605 protects the privacy of radio or wire communications by prohibiting the interception of such communications or the divulgence of the
contents of such communications. Id. The dual purpose of the investigation, as described
by Congressman Moss, was "to determine whether existing law, specifically section 605
of the Communications Act, is being abused by the Executive Branch" and "the possible
need for corrective legislation . . . relating to the protection and interception of private,
interstate communications." Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 193.
Certain activities by the President are excepted from 6 605:
Nothing . . in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat.
1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security information against foreign
intelligence activities.
18 U.S.C. 5 2511(3) (1970).
12. The four categories were:
1. Full and complete copies of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) national security request letters, in the possession or control of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and its 24 operating companies listed below, for
access to phone lines handling either verbal or non-verbal communications.
2. Copies of any and all records in the possession or control of AT&T or its
operating companies prior to 1969 when written FBI requests were not routinely
requested by AT&T and its operating companies.
3. Copies of any and all applicable Bell System Practices (BSP's) describing
company policy regarding national security "taps" or "provision of facilities"
to law enforcement or intelligence agencies. This should include both current
BSP's and any BSP's on the subject which have since been revised or discontinued.
4. Copies of internal memoranda, correspondence, board minutes, or other
records relative to AT&T, and/or any AT&T operating company, practice or

.
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in the possession of AT&T and its affiliates. The White House
responded to the AT&T subpoena by attempting to negotiate a
compromise with the subcommittee. The principal focus of the
negotiation efforts was to substitute copies of memoranda prepared by the FBI for the leased line letters. These memoranda
describe the facts and circumstances relevant to the requested
surveillance, and provide the basic information considered by the
Attorney General in making his decision.
The general concept of such a substitution served the interests of both sides. One of the principal concerns underlying the
congressional investigation was whether the wiretaps had been
restricted to foreign intelligence matters or activities or whether
some of the taps had been used for domestic purposes. The letters
themselves contained no information concerning the background
or activities of the person whose telephone had been tapped or
why those activities qualified him-or failed to qualify him-as
a legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance target.13By contrast,
the backup memoranda would reveal to the subcommittee the
circumstances and considerations that justified the surveillance.
The executive branch also preferred to release the memoranda
(with certain deletions to prevent identification of the specific
targets) rather than the letters themselves. Release of the letters
would increase the number of people having access to information
that could identify every foreign intelligence target under United
States surveillance since 1969.
Through a series of negotiations lasting nearly a month,
agreement was reached on some, but not all points. It was agreed
that AT&T would provide to the subcommittee, and the subcommittee in turn would provide to the FBI, a list of the dates of the
leased line letters. From these dates, the FBI would identify the
letters that pertained exclusively to domestic surveillance^,^^ and
the backup memoranda pertaining to domestic surveillances
would be supplied with only such minor deletions as were necespolicy with respect to national security "taps" or "provision of facilities" to law
enforcement or intelligence agencies, covering the last 10 years.
United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454, 455-56 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
13. It would be theoretically possible, of course, for the subcommittee to conduct its
own investigation to determine whether a tap on a particular telephone was for legitimate
foreign intelligence, but there is no suggestion that the subcommittee proposed, or felt
itself gualified, to carry out that kind of highly secret and sensitive investigation.
14. Leased line letters in this category would be limited to those that occurred between 1969, when the leased line letter procedure began, and June 19, 1972, the date of
the Keith decision. See note 7 supra.
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sary to shield particularly sensitive ongoing investigations. With
regard to foreign intelligence surveillances, the subcommittee
would select a random sample of the backup memoranda for two
selected years, 1972 and 1975. The FBI would make copies of
these sample memoranda, substituting generic classifications or
descriptions15 for any information that might identify targets or
sources. The subcommittee would then have access to the edited
memoranda at the FBI.
The irreconcilable point of difference was the subcommittee's view that in order to verify the integrity of the expurgating
process, the subcommittee would need to compare a subsample
of the edited backup memoranda with unexpurgated originals.
The subcommittee proposed that three representatives be
allowed to compare the original and edited memoranda a t the
FBI, and that they be permitted to take their notes back to the
subcommittee. The executive branch opposed this plan principally because the notes, if allowed to leave the FBI, would become subcommittee records, subject to examination by any
House member under House Rule XI 8 2(e)(2).I6
On July 22, after nearly a month of negotiations and one day
prior to the July 23 subpoena compliance date, the executive
branch filed suit against AT&T to obtain a temporary restraining
order." At the temporary restraining order hearing, Congressman
John Moss, chairman of the subcommittee, presented a motion
to intervene which the court granted. After argument, the court
issued an order restraining AT&T from releasing the letters.
15. For example, the term "Middle East Diplomat" might be substituted for the
target's name.
16. Rule XI 8 2(e)(2) provides: "All committee hearings, records, data, charts, and
files shall be kept separate and distinct from the congressional office records of the member serving as chairman of the committee; and such records shall be the property of the
House and all Members of the House shall have access thereto." W. BROWN,
MANUAL
AND
RULESOF THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES,
H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 420
(1975).
17. At the same time, the President sent a letter to Congressman Staggers, chairman
of the full Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, who had signed the subpoena.
The letter constituted an invocation of executive privilege. It advised the chairman:
I have determined that compliance with the subpoena would involve unacceptable risks of disclosure of extremely sensitive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information and would be detrimental to the national defense and
foreign policy of the United States and damaging to the national security. Compliance with the Committee's subpoena would, therefore, be contrary to the
public interest.
United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454,458 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion) (quoting letter from
Gerald R. Ford to Harley 0.Staggers (July 22, 1976)).
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Eight days later the district court rendered final judgment for the
executive branch. l8
The court observed that the case involved an assertion of
executive privilege having an effect on Congress' powers of speech
or debate under Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,19
but rejected the position taken by Congressman Moss that the
legislative authority to investigate is absolute. In the district
court's view, "the power of one coordinate branch of government
must be balanced against that of the other. Neither can be considered in a vacuum."20The district court concluded not only that
"[tlhe helpfulness of the national security request letters in determining the basis on which the wire taps were instituted is
minimal," but also that "the President has determined that release of the material would present an unacceptable risk of disclosure of the most sensitive national security and foreign policy
matters." Because "[sluch a determination by the Executive is
generally accorded great deference by the courts, "11 judgment was
rendered for the executive and a permanent injunction issued.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuitn
took a different approach. After holding that there was federal
jurisdiction to consider the case under 28 U.S.C. Q 1331," the
court held that it need not decide whether the case was moot,24
whether it presented a nonjusticiable political question,z5or how
it should resolve the "patently conflicting assertions of absolute
a~thority."~~ollowing
its earlier precedent in Nixon v. Sirica, *
18. United States v. AT&T,419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
19. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
20. 419 F. Supp. at 459.
21. Id. at 460.
22. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d
121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
23. Section 1331 grants jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States, wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28
U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1970). The court found a federal question in the executive's claim that
"its constitutional powers with respect to national security and foreign affairs included
the right to prevent transmission of the request letters to Congress." 551 F.2d at 389. The
$10,000 requirement was satisfied by the court's conclusion that "far more than $10,000
would be required to repair [the] damage" which would result from disclosure, such as
"disruption of diplomatic relations and of our intelligence and counterintelligence programs, including possible danger to the lives of counterintelligence sources." Id.
24. 551 F.2d at 390. The subpoena would have expired with the adjournment of the
House, since the House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body. Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 512 (1975).
25. 551 F.2d at 390-91. The court did face this issue in its second opinion. See notes
126-29 and accompanying text infra.
26. 551 F.2d at 391-92.
27. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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the court held that issues of such magnitude involving the constitutional powers of its sister branches should not be judicially resolved until every opportunity for a negotiated settlement had
been exhausted, especially since (at least in the court's view) the
parties had already come so close to reaching a settlement."
While observing that "[ilt would be the function of the parties
to propose the structure and its details," the court suggested in
some detail how the parties might proceed.2QThe court of appeals
ordered the district court "to report to us concerning the progress
of these negotiations within three months of the date of this opinion, unless the executive and congressional parties jointly ask for
an extension or report an earlier impasse."30
Negotiations pursuant to the court of appeals' first opinion
and order extended over a period of two months, culminating in
a final offer by the Justice Department closely approximating the
suggestions contained in the court of appeals' opinion. The subcommittee found this proposal unacceptable.
When the case came back before the court of appeals for the
second time,31that court held the controversy justiciable and rejected the claims of both parties that their respective substantive
positions were entitled to absolute constitutional protection. The
court declined, however, to render a final judgment in favor of
either side. Adhering to the fundamental premise of its earlier
opinion that, to the maximum extent possible, the conflict should
be resolved by negotiation between the article I and article I1
branches rather than by decree from the article 111 branch, the
~~
court elected "to continue our approach of g r a d ~ a l i s m . "The
court ordered that the parties experiment with the following procedure: Members of the subcommittee staff would be allowed to
examine a sample of ten unexpurgated memoranda, and would
be allowed to take notes. The notes, however, would remain under
28. "There was almost a settlement in 1976. It may well be attainable in 1977." 551
F.2d at 394. Earlier the court had observed: "It is an additional, if fortuitous, advantage
that under o w decision, negotiations can be conducted not only by a new House but by a
new President." Id. a t 390.
29. Id. at 395 n.18. The suggestion of the court was that a small number of congressional staff investigators be given access to a subsample of the unexpurgated backup
memoranda. The President would be allowed to certify the investigators' security clearance, and the investigators' notes would be held under seal and not revealed unless there
was a claim that there were discrepancies between the original and edited memoranda.
That claim would be submitted to the district court, which would base-jts decision on an
in camera comparison of both sets of memoranda and the investigators' sealed notes.
30. Id. a t 395.
31. 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32. Id. a t 131.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

2311

239

seal with the FBI. If inaccuracies were found, the subcommittee
could take its claim to the district court, where the memoranda
would be examined in camera. The executive would be allowed
to make substitutions, but only upon an in camera showing that
the memoranda were accurately edited and that the contents
were extraordinarily sensitive. While this procedure was being
carried out, the subcommittee was to have access to all memoranda for the sample years (1972 and 1975) in edited form.33
Thus, on the delicate and difficult ultimate issue in the
case-accommodating the competing constitutional needs of two
sister branches, and declaring a winner-commonsense practicality once again prevailed over traditional judicial form. In its second opinion as in its first, the court of appeals used the power and
authority of the federal judiciary not to settle the dispute between
the other two branches, but rather to intensify the incentive and
the pressure on these branches to settle the dispute themselves.
The theoretical and practical strengths of this approach are discussed in Section III, Subsection C of this Article.

B. Implications of the Controversy
The court of appeals in its first opinion expressed the view
that "[tlhe negotiations came close to success."34In one sense
this is a correct statement. The information a t issue-targets and
sources contained in a subsample of original memorandaconstituted only a very small portion of the total information in
the memoranda, viewed either from the standpoint of word count
or substantive content.
From another vantage point, however, the disagreement over
verification represented nothing less than a head-on conflict between the fundamental authority and responsibility of the article
I and article I1 branches: congressional powers of investigation
versus Presidential responsibility for preservation of foreign intelligence secrets. Chairman Moss insisted that the subcommittee's rights of investigation, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Eastland, were absolute and that the subcommittee could not
discharge its responsibility without verifying, a t least on a sample
basis, (1) that there were in fact original memoranda from which
the expurgated copies had been made, and (2) the accuracy of
the generic substitutes. The President, on the other hand, relied
33. Id. at 131-32.
34. 551 F.2d at 386.
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upon United States v. Nixon" to his assertion that it was the executive's prerogative to decide whether sensitive intelligence information should be disclosed. From the executive's viewpoint,
the proposed verification process raised the same concerns as did
access to the leased line letters: identification of foreign intelligence surveillance targets. Though the problem was susceptible
to resolution through negotiation, neither was willing to trust the
other. Chairman Moss would not accept the President's assurance that no domestic surveillances were involved, and the President was unwilling to run the risk that out of 435 members of
Congress having access to the information, not one would disclose
it.36Thus, each side was in the unaccustomed position of having
one of its constitutional responsibilities in a face-off with an
equally clear constitutional responsibility of another branch. Accordingly, the prerequisite to a negotiated settlement was a concession by one branch of part of its constitutional authority to the
corresponding benefit of the other branch.37
During the negotiations the dispute had centered around the
allocation of authority between two branches of government. But
once the suit was filed, the conflict expanded to embrace the
authority of the article I11 branch as well. In the initial district
court proceedings, counsel for Chairman Moss took the position
that the court's restraining order would have no effect on Congress and that article I gave Congress exclusive jurisdiction over
all aspects of the matter.38 On the day following the temporary
35. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
36. The court of appeals observed that such release could be forbidden either by the
subcommittee, the committee, or the full House. 551 F.2d a t 386. Any individual member
of Congress, however, may publicize even the most sensitive information, and so long as
he does so within the scope of congressional activity covered by the speech or debate
clause-such as floor debate or committee hearings-that clause immunizes him from any
civil or criminal consequences from such publication. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1972).
37. An objective examiner of the record in United States v. AT&T might conclude
that just such a concession was in fact made by the President and rejected by Chairman
Moss. There was an offer to permit the chairman himself to compare the expurgated
copies with the original documents from which they were copied. Joint Appendix, supra
note 9, a t 145-48. This might be viewed as effectively resolving the standoff in favor of
the legislative branch. Nevertheless, the chairman rejected this offer. In his view the
subcommittee had a right of access to the information, and the expurgated-copy-withverification procedure was itself a compromise. Particularly significant in the chairman's
view was the fact that "[wle have been advised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
that a t least 14 Executive Branch officials and staff have routine access to these documents, and an unknown number of additional staff have access on a 'need-to-know' basis."
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 148 (letter from Chairman Moss to Assistant Attorney
General Rex E. Lee).
38. At the outset of his argument a t the temporary restraining order hearing, counsel
for the subcommittee stated: "The issue is, I don't think your Honor with due respect,
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restraining order hearing, however, the subcommittee elected not
to enforce its subpoena and thus avoided placing AT&T in the
difficult position of having to choose between being held in contempt of court or contempt of C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~
United States v. AT&T marks the second time in history
that a case involving an assertion of executive privilege against a
congressional subpoena has reached the federal court of appeals
level." It is the first such case where the purpose of the executive
privilege assertion was to protect foreign intelligence secrets. In
light of the holding in United States v. Nixon4l that executive
with all due respect to Your Honor and to the Court, I don't think you have jurisdiction
to block Article I of the Constitution where we have, where the Subcommittee has clear
jurisdiction." Transcript of Oral Argument, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order a t
20, United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
The following colloquy occurred a t the time the district court judge indicated that
he would grant a temporary restraining order:
T H E COURT: I am going to grant a TRO.
MR. LEMOV: That won't affect the Congress.
T H E COURT: All Right.
MR. LEMOV: I am sorry, Your Honor.
T H E COURT: All right. I am glad t o know the position of your constituents.
MR. LEMOV: Our position is that Article One is self sufficient and it is
notT H E COURT: In other words, you are going to flaunt the TRO, is that
it?
MR. LEMOV: I would not say we are going to flaunt the TRO. I t isT H E COURT: Well, what did you say?
MR. LEMOV: I would say that the TRO would not bind the Congress in
the exercise of its legislative powers, but I would refer that matter to our Subcommittee.
T H E COURT: Yes.
MR. LEMOV: T o make that decision.
Id. at 29.
39. The occasion was a subcommittee hearing held a t the appointed time for compliance with the subpoena, Friday, July 23. The witnesses a t the hearing were AT&T officials. Chairman Moss reiterated the view stated the evening before by his counsel that
the courts had no authority to enjoin compliance with a properly issued congressional
subpoena. Nevertheless, he announced that he would not precipitate the issue by holding
AT&T officials in contempt of Congress:
MR. MOSS: Well, the Chair recognizes the very difficult position American Telephone and Telegraph is placed in because of the actions of the court,
which were taken late yesterday afternoon.
While the Subcommittee or the Chairman, does not recognize that the court
has a lawful authority to interfere with this committee, it recognizes that to
pursue this matter at this moment would place AT&T between the very difficult
choices of being in contempt of the House or in contempt of the court.
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, a t 95.
40. The first was Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 90-105 infra.
41. 418 U S . 683 (1974).
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privilege is constitutionally based, and the holding in Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund" one year later that at least
some aspects of the issuance and enforcement of congressional
subpoenas are included within the speech or debate immunity,
issues raised by the confrontation between these two constitutionally based prerogatives are likely to be increasingly important in
the future. In AT&T, and potentially in future cases, the scope
of these competing congressional and executive prerogatives has
an important bearing on the conflict between them. Two issues
involved with the scope of these prerogatives are discussed in
Section 11.

The final issue with which this Article will deal concerns the
standards by which federal courts should resolve conflicts between Congress' investigative powers and a Presidential assertion
of executive privilege." Before such standards can be delineated,
however, the scope of the two competing powers and the constitutional anchorage of each must be explored. Accordingly, this Section will examine two problems. The first concerns the scope of
the speech or debate clause as it relates to congressional investigations. The second involves the scope of the executive privilege
doctrine when the information is in the hands of a private third
party.
A. Speech or Debate and Congressional Investigations
Congress' investigative powers are not expressly authorized
by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has long recognized,
however, that they are so essential to the legislative function as
to be implied by the general vesting of legislative power in Congress." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund contains
42. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
43. Section V infra.
44. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927). The investigatory powers are not unlimited, however, and may
be employed only "in aid of the legislative function." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 189 (1881). In addition, a congressional committee must show that it has been authorized to make the investigation and that the information sought is pertinent. Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 201, 208-09. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959) (giving a much more liberal interpretation of the authorization requirement).
The protection afforded by the speech or debate clause has similar limitations in that
it protects only those activities which fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,376 (1951).See Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S.
306 (1973) (clause did not bar suit against person who, with authorization from Congress,
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arguable bases for an inference that the speech or debate clause,
where applicable, affords an even larger measure of support for
congressional investigative activity than are implied by Congress'
general investigative powers.45
The speech or debate clause appears in the first paragraph
of article I, section 6 of the Constitution. That paragraph provides:
The Senators and Representatives Shall receive a Compensation for their services, to be ascertained by Law, and Paid out
of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases,
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged
from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.

Both the context and also the language of the speech or debate
clause imply that its fundamental purpose is to prevent the kind
of interference with the discharge of congressional responsibilities
that would result from Senators and Representatives being involuntarily involved in legal proceedings while Congress is in session." The thrust of the clause is to protect members of the Congress (or their aides) from arrest or litigation as defendants. This
distributed allegedly injurious materials to the public rather than limiting distribution
solely to legislative activities); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (clause would
bar questioning of congressional aide, but would not preclude an inquiry into alleged
arrangements for the private publication of the Pentagon Papers); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (clause did not bar prosecution for acceptance of a bribe).
45. One of these inferential bases is provided by Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, analyzed in this Section. Another is the Court's distinction of its earlier holdings in
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959).See note 51 infra. A third is the bare fact that the Court decided the case under
the speech or debate clause. Whether speech or debate extends to congressional investigative activities other than the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas, and whether those
components of congressional investigations that are included within speech or debate
(assuming there is a difference) enjoy greater constitutional protection, are questions
outside the reach of this Article. For reasons discussed in Section V, the controlling
consideration for present purposes is the fact that Congress' investigative powers which
come into confrontation with assertions of executive privilege are constitutionally based.
46. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969). See also Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (same
OF CONGRESS,
THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE
immunity accorded state legislators); LIBRARY
UNITED
STATES
OF AMERICA,
ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION,
S. DOC.NO. 82, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 117-20 (1973). For a detailed history of the speech or debate clause, see Reinstein &
Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HAW. L. REV. 1113
(1973). For a complete discussion of all Supreme Court decisions regarding the clause, see
Suarez, Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Existing Distinctions and a Proposal for
a New Definitional Approach, 20 VILL.L. REV. 97 (1974).
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is the only application of speech or debate that has ever been
made by Supreme Court holdings.
In Eastland the Court held that the speech or debate clause
precluded a federal court from enjoining the issuance of a congressional subpoena duces tecum directing a bank to produce
records of an organization, notwithstanding the Court's apparent
acceptance of the argument that the disclosure of such records
would infringe upon the plaintiff's first amendment rights of asso~iation.~
' issue left unresolved by Eastland is whether speech
An
or debate protection is applicable in those cases where no congressional person or entity is named as a defendant. Alternatively
stated, the issue is whether speech or debate creates only an
immunity from suit for Congressmen and their aides, or whether
it constitutes a positive constitutional guarantee that can be asserted either defensively or affirmatively. The issue is present in
cases involving a n assertion of executive privilege where the executive branch can simply refuse to disclose information in its possession, thus forcing Congress to go to court as a plaintiff to
enforce its subpoena. The issue also arises in the AT&T situation
since the executive branch can achieve its nondisclosure objective
through a judicial decree that runs only to noncongressional parties to the litigation, thus forcing Congress into the role of intervenor.
Although the issue was not raised in Eastland, some support
can be found in that case for the proposition that speech or debate
protects all congressional investigations from judicial interfere n ~ eRather
. ~ ~ than resting the decision upon the simple fact that
47. Eastland involved a subpoena issued by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security. The subcommittee was investigating the activities of the United States Servicemen's Fund (USSF) and, pursuant to that investigation, issued a subpoena to the bank
where USSF had an account, commanding the bank to produce " 'any records appertaining to or involving the account or accounts of [USSF].' " 421 U.S. at 494. USSF and its
members brought suit to enjoin implementation of the subpoena. Named as defendants
were Subcommittee Chairman Eastland, nine other Senators, the subcommittee's chief
counsel, and the bank. Id. a t 495. The bank did not participate in the action. Id. at 495
n.5.
48. The issue would have been raised in Eastland if the suit had been pursued exclusively against the bank. (Although the bank was named as a defendant, it did not participate in the action-apparently because it was never served. Id. at 494-95 nn.4 & 5.)
Although the majority opinion does not deal with the issue, the theoretical complications
from the presence of the bank-a nongovernmental entity-as a defendant in the case
were the focus of some concern a t the oral argument. During the rebuttal argument, the
Court persisted in questioning Mr. Miller, attorney for the subcommittee and Senator
Eastland, concerning the nonavailability of the speech or debate immunity to the bank,
until it finally extracted from him the following concession:
MR. MILLER: The Court of Appeals decision authorizes a judgment
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the decree in that case ran only to Senators and their aides, the
Court emphasized the disruption and delay of the legislative process occasioned by judicial review. At one point the Court stated:
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for
nearly five years, during which the Members and their aide
have been obliged to devote time to consultation with their
counsel concerning the litigation, and have been distracted
from the purpose of their inquiry. The Clause was written to
prevent the need to he confronted by such "questioning" and
to forbid invocation of judicial power to challenge the wisdom
of Congress' use of its investigative a~thority.~@

Also instructive is the Court's approach to the issue in
Eastland. As the Court framed the issue, "[tlhe question to be
resolved is whether the actions of [Congress] fall within the
'sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' If they do, [Congress]
'shall not be questioned in any other Place' about those activities
since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are absolute . . . ."50 The significance of these two sentences, is of course,
their confinement of the relevant issues in the case to the scope
of the speech or debate clause. The Court found that the power
to investigate and the subpoena power plainly fell within the
"legitimate legislative sphere" protected by speech or debate.
Having found that, the Court refused to balance the speech or
debate interests against the plain tiff's countervailing first
amendment claim.51
against the Senators. And if I say so myself, it would be the only time, to my
knowledge, that any such typeQUESTION: But if we should reverse that, Mr. Miller, there will still be,
in this lawsuit, something that involves the banks?
MR. MILLER: The banks are, as I understand it, are still defendants,
andQUESTION: So even if you win, this lawsuit is not completely over?
MR. MILLER: I assume that they could still proceed against the banks,
to-the banks are defendants unlessQUESTION: And if they do in that circumstance, your victory on the
Speech or Debate Clause will not assist the banks any, in their defense of the
lawsuit.
MR. MILLER: I would think not, Your Honor. I would think not.
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 68-68a.
49. 421 U.S. at 511 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. a t 501 (footnote omitted).
51. The Court recognized that in two earlier opinions, Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 198 (1957), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959), first
amendment rights had been balanced against congressional investigatory power. Those
cases were distinguishable, however, because they were criminal prosecutions, wherein the
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On the other hand, Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in
Eastland (joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart) contains language t h a t appears squarely supportive of the view that the
speech or debate clause provides immunity only in suits against
Congressmen or their aides. The following excerpts are illustrative:
As our cases have consistently held, . . . the Speech or Debate
Clause protects legislators and their confidential aides from
suit; it does not immunize congressional action from judicial
review.52
[ y h e protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is personal.
It extends to Members and their counsel acting in a legislative
capacity; it does not preclude judicial review of their decisions
in an appropriate case, whether they take the form of legislation
or a subpoena.53
Our prior cases arising under the Speech or Debate Clause indicate that only a Member of Congress or his aide may not be
called upon to defend a subpoena against constitutional objection, and not that the objection will not be heard at

The language cited above, taken either alone or in context,55
defendants asserted their first amendment rights to justify their refusals to answer congressional inquiries, and thus Congress had sought the aid of the judiciary in enforcing
its will. Eastland, on the other hand, was "an attempt to interfere with an ongoing activity
by Congress, and that activity is . . . within the legitimate legislative sphere"; thus
balancing would not be applied. 421 U.S. a t 509 n.16. Another commentator suggests that
the import of Eastland "is not simply that particular defendants were immune from suit,
but rather that pre-enforcement review of a congressional subpoena may not be available
a t all.'' The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.L. REV.47, 136 (1975) (footnote omitted).
52. 421 U.S. at 513 (Marshall, J., concurring).
53. Id. a t 515.
54. Id. a t 516.
There may be another explanation for the apparent neatness with which these and
other excerpts from Justice Marshall's concurrence fit the argument that the speech or
debate immunity applies only where Congressmen or their aides are the actual defendants. The peculiar problem in Eastland was that the persons whose first amendment
rights were allegedly threatened did not have custody over the documents whose disclosure
would constitute the alleged invasion of first amendment interests. As a consequence, the
usual procedure for challenging a subpoena on constitutional grounds-refusal to comply
followed by litigation of the legal issues in the enforcement proceeding-was not available
to the United States Servicemen's Fund, "since a neutral third party could not be expected to resist the subpoena by placing itself in contempt." Id. a t 514. Thus, it may be
that the purpose of Justice Marshall's concurrence in Eastland was simply to emphasize
that, notwithstanding the absolute nature of the speech or debate guarantee, it was proper
for the district court to entertain the suit brought by the servicemen's fund. Because the
fund was not subject to the subpoena it could not assert its constitutional interests in the
customary way, by resisting compliance.
55. Particularly if that context includes the concession extracted from counsel for the
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implies that at least three members of the United States Supreme
Court have concluded that the speech or debate clause provides
only immunity from suit to Congressmen and their aides. While
Justice Marshall's opinion stops short of an assertion that the
speech or debate clause would be unavailing in a suit where the
only relief sought was an injunction against a private party, that
is its necessary import. The opinion recognizes and approves the
absolute nature of the speech or debate guarantee which, where
applicable, puts an end to judicial inquiry. It also approves the
district court's entertaining the suit under the peculiar procedural posture of that case. But both of these propositions were
also recognized by the majority, and Mr. Justice Marshall's concurrence appears to be written for the principal purpose of expressing a view on an issue that is not covered by the majority
opinion.
The issue whether the speech or debate clause guprantees
only an immunity for members of Congress and their aides when
they are joined as defendants in litigation, or whether it constitutes an affirmative grant of power, was raised in United States
v. AT&T because the documents at issue were in the possession
of a private party, and disclosure could be enjoined without naming a member of Congress or congressional aide as a defendant.
In its brief in AT&T the executive argued:
Both by its express language and by Supreme Court interpretation, the Speech or Debate Clause creates nothing more than an
immunity of Congress in actions against them. It is not a tool
that Congress may use to prevent judicial determination of Constitutional issues. It is a defense to either criminal or civil liability and available only to members of Congress and their aides.
It cannot be asserted for the benefit of private parties or entities,
either by those private parties, or by members of C o n g r e s ~ . ~ ~

The district court rejected the executive's position:
The plaintiff has taken the position that this action should
be considered one seeking solely to restrain a private entity,
AT&T, from releasing documents in its possession. In this way,
plaintiff argues, the Court need not consider the applicability of
the Speech or Debate Clause, since the immunity of that constitutional provision runs only to members of Congress and their
subcommittee at oral argument-see note 48 supra.
56. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 50-51, United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454
(D.D.C.), modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (second opinion).
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close aides when defending against a lawsuit, and does not afford any protection to a private entity such as AT&T. This
argument is advanced so that the Court can avoid dealing with
a constitutional confrontation between two of the three
branches of our Government. But to take this avenue would be
to place form over substance. The effect of any injunction entered by this Court enjoining the release of materials by AT&T
to the Subcommittee would have the same effect as if this Court
were to quash the Subcommittee's subpoena. In this sense the
action is one against the power of the Subcommittee and should
be treated as such, assuming that Representative Moss has authority to speak for the Sub~ommittee.~'

Neither of the court of appeals' opinions reached the ultimate
issue on the merits, but the second opinion appears to agree with
the executive branch on the Eastland issue.58
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Eastland and the court of
appeals' opinion in United States v. A T&T notwithstanding, the
speech or debate protection should not be limited to cases in
which relief is sought against members of Congress and their
aides. The reasons for this position can be best appreciated in
connection with the somewhat comparable problem of the applicability of executive privilege to information outside the control
of the government.
57. 419 F. Supp. a t 458.
The reach of speech or debate immunity was not dispositive in AT&T. The district
court held that even though speech or debate is not limited to suits against Congressmen
or their aides, and even though Eastland imparted to speech or debate a potency that gives
it absolute powers of infringement on first amendment rights, it does not necessarily follow
that speech or debate powers are similarly absolute when pitted against the constitutionally based prerogatives of another branch. Id. at 459-61.
58. The court of appeals' second opinion states:
The fact that the Executive is not in a position to assert its claim of constitutional right by refusing to comply with a subpoena does not bar the challenge
so long as members of the Subcommittee are not, themselves, made defendants
in a suit to enjoin implementation of the subpoena. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at
513, . . . Justice Marshall concurring.
567 F.2d at 129. The court went on to say:
In sum, while this case is similar in several respects to the situation in Eastland,
. . . for purposes of considering whether the Executive's claim is entitled to at
least some judicial consideration, we emphasize that no member of the Subcommittee in the present dispute has been made a defendant in a judicial proceeding. The courts do not accept the concept that Congress' investigatory power is
absolute. What the cases establish is that the immunity from judicial inquiry
afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause is personal to members of Congress.
Where they are not harassed by personal suit against them, the clause cannot
be invoked to immunize the congressional subpoena from judicial scrutiny.
Id. a t 130.
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B. Executive Privilege: Applicability Where the Information
Is Not i n the Possession of the Government
One view of executive privilege is that it is a narrowly limited, strictly defensive doctrine, applicable only in circumstances
where the executive branch declines to supply information in its
possession. On the other hand, executive privilege may be viewed
as a n affirmative power to prevent disclosure of information
whose disclosure would be harmful to the interests of government.
In most circumstances, the difference in the two views is of no .
practical significance, because the information sought is in the
executive's possession. This is not always the case, however. In
order t o carry out certain governmental functions the United
States must enter into contracts with private companies and
share with them highly secret information. Probably the most
common example of this practice is in the manufacture of military equipment, which is frequently accomplished through contracts with private companies. Pursuant to such contracts, the
government makes available to the private contractor design
data, construction details, and other secret information. Another
example is of course the line-leasing arrangement involved in
United State v. A T & T which required the executive to share the
location of its wiretapping activities with the telephone company.
In these and other contexts, so long as the government elects not
to go into the business of running the nation's telephone service,
or building its own national defense hardware, it must enter into
contractual arrangements with private entities and often share
highly secret information with them. Is that information-which
originated from the government, and which would not be in the
possession of the private entity but for the governmental function
performed by that entity-subject to executive privilege?
The limited judicial authority on this question would appear
to answer it in the affirmative. Although the only case squarely
on point is United States v. AT&T, and none of the opinions in
that case discusses the issue, the district court held in favor of the
executive. Additionally, the court of appeals' second opinion appears to rest on the premise that the invocation of executive privilege is not impeded by the fact that the information is in nongovernmental possession. And, two earlier cases have implied an
affirmative executive privilege to restrain third-party disclosures.
In E. W. Bliss Co. v. United state^,'^ the Supreme Court
59. 248 U.S. 37 (1918).
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affirmed an order enjoining a government contractor "from exhibiting or communicating the construction and operation of a
torpedo known as the Bliss-Leavitt torpedo."60The government
in the Bliss case was enforcing an explicit contract, but the Supreme Court quoted with approval this observation of the lower
court:
Throughout the entire record, in the contracts, correspondence and dealings of the parties, the importance of secrecy is
everywhere manifest. T h e nature of the services rendered was
such that secrecy might almost be implied. It is difficult to
imagine a nation giving to one of its citizens contracts to manufacture implements necessary to the national defense and permitting that citizen to disclose the construction of such implement or sell it to another nation. The very nature of the service
makes the construction urged by the defendant ~ n t e n a b l e . ~ '

Similarly, in United States v. M a r ~ h e t t i the
, ~ ~ Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld an injunctive order against a former CIA
official enforcing an agreement not to publish certain information
concerning the Central Intelligence Agency.63It would thus appear that executive privilege can be used affirmatively to prevent
the disclosure of sensitive information in the hands of third parties.
There are similarities between this issue and the issue discussed in Subsection A of this Section, the scope of the speech or
debate clause as it relates to congressional investigations. In both
instances the issue is raised in cases where a nongovernmental
third party is involved: In the speech or debate cases, the private
party (rather than Congress) is the potential defendant in a suit
60. Id. at 39.
61. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
62. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
63. The court stated:
[Vhe agency requires its employees as a condition of employment to sign a
secrecy agreement, and such agreements are entirely appropriate to a program
in implementation of the congressional direction of secrecy. Marchetti, of
course, could have refused to sign, but then he would have not been employed,
and he would not have been given access to the classified information he may
now want to broadcast.
Confidentiality inheres in the situation and the relationship of the parties.
Since information highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the
national defense was involved, the law would probably imply a secrecy agreement had there been no formally expressed agreement, but it certainly lends a
high degree of reasonableness to the contract in its protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure.
Id. a t 1316 (emphasis added).
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to prevent compliance with the congressional subpoena-the
bank in Eastland, the telephone company in AT&T. In the executive privilege context, the private party (rather than the President) is the one in possession of the information whose disclosure
an assertion of executive privilege seeks to prevent. In both settings the question is whether the doctrines are limited to defensive uses, relieving the particular branch from the necessity of
taking action that it views as undesirable, or whether the doctrines can also be used to require action or forbearance on the part
of someone else. The most important similarity is that in each
case the fundamental issue is whether the reach of a constitutionally based doctrine central to the operation of one of the branches
of government should be determined by conceptual considerations or by the policy on which the doctrine is founded.
With both speech or debate and executive privilege, the arguments for a narrow interpretation are largely conceptual. In the
case of executive privilege, the premise concept is a privilege to
refrain from divulging information within one's own control. In
the case of speech or debate, the premise concept is an immunity
against being joined as a defendant in a lawsuit. On the other
hand, policy considerations in both cases eschew a restrictive
view. A basic purpose of executive privilege is to permit the President to withhold information whose dissemination, in his considered view, would be sufficiently detrimental to the public interest
that such extraordinary action as assertion of executive privilege
is warranted. Physical possession of the information is irrelevant
to the considerations that the President takes into account. This
does not mean that the President can prevent the disclosure of
any information in the possession of any private person or entity
upon a determination by him that its disclosure would be detrimental to the national interest. Certainly the President could not
prevent a private corporation from disclosing information whose
existence and development were unrelated to government, no
matter how detrimental to governmental interests the disclosure
might be. But in cases such as Bliss, Marchetti, and AT&T, the
information came from the government, the only reason that the
information is in the possession of the private party is because it
is essential to the performance by that private party of a governmental function, and but for the performance of that essential
governmental function the information would never have been
supplied. In that kind of case the President should have the same
power to prevent disclosure as if the information were in the
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possession of one of his subordinate^.^^
Similar policy considerations apply in delineating the scope
of the speech or debate clause. The applicability of that constitutional guarantee to congressional investigations should not turn
on the fortuity of whether Congress participates in the litigation
as plaintiff, defendant, or intervenor. While it is true that in
Eastland the congressional litigants were defendants, it is also
true that the impact on congressional activity (and therefore on
speech or debate) will be the same when the executive can prevent third parties from disclosing, without naming Congress as a
defendant, as in AT&T. Thus, the district court in AT&T was
correct in concluding that to draw a distinction between members
of Congress (or their aides) as defendants and as intervenors
"would be to place form over s ~ b s t a n c e . " ~ ~
For these policy reasons, the applicability of either executive
privilege or speech or debate should not be foreclosed in those
cases where the documents or other information are in the possession of a private party or where the congressional entity participates in the litigation as plaintiff or intervenor. In considering the
conflicting interests of the two doctrines, as discussed in Section
V, the courts should afford a generous interpretation that will
give full effect to the underlying purpose of each.
In fact, however, very few executive privilege-congressional
subpoena cases have reached the courts. One of the reasons is
that there are significant roadblocks-constitutional and otherwise-to each of the avenues by which such disputes can reach
the courts. Some of the problems attendant upon bringing executive privilege-congressional subpoena problems before the courts
constitute the subject of Sections I11 and IV.
64. During the early stages of the AT&T litigation, the government relied on an
agency theory. The complaint squarely alleged that "defendant AT&T has participated
as an agent of the United States in effectuating certain national security investigations."
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, a t 16-17. The agency argument was not pursued beyond
the pleading stage, and the agency analogy is not very helpful. Whether an agency relationship exists or not is simply irrelevant to the competing interests on both sides of the
information disclosure issue. Mr. Marchetti was quite clearly an agent of the CIA and of
the United States. The Bliss Company, at least for purposes of torpedo manufacture, was
an agent of the United States. AT&T's agency is more questionable. But the important
point is that focusing on the agency issue diverts attention away from the relevant issues,
the involvement of the government in the creation of the information, and whether the
government as a matter of public interest and constitutional doctrine should be able to
prevent its disclosure.
65. 419 F. Supp. a t 458.
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The typical executive privilege-congressional subpoena conflict arises because the executive has determined not to give information to the Congress. The conflict is usually resolved either by
negotiation or by eventual abandonment of the attempt to obtain
the information. In a small number of cases, however, a negotiated settlement will not be possible. Since the executive usually
has possession of the documents, the next move is up to Congress.
There are there three procedures available to Congress to implement its investigatory objective:" (1) direct punishment for contempt by the appropriate House of Congress; (2) criminal prosecution by the appropriate United States Attorney under 2 U.S.C.
5 194; or (3) a civil suit to enforce the subpoena. Each of these
alternatives presents separate but significant hurdles.

A. Direct Punishment for Contempt
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer upon
Congress the power to punish for contempt," Congress' power to
do so was early established by Congress itself8 and also by the
Supreme Court. In Anderson v. Dunn the Court held that to deny
66. Of course Congress has indirect means available for enforcing its will. It can cut
off funds or attempt to impeach the President for failure to respond to its wishes. Even
an appropriation cutoff, however, is not always successful, as demonstrated by President
Eisenhower's response to a cutoff of foreign aid funds because the executive failed to reveal
information. Eisenhower simply instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to disregard the
EXECUTIVE
cutoff and to draw on federal funds to make the payments. See R. BERGER,
PRIVILEGE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL
WASHINGTON
COVER-UP
MYTH306 (1974);C. MOLLENHOFF,
173-74(1962).
67. Article I, 8 5 of the Constitution deals with such internal affairs as the authority
of each House to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members, the
constitution of a quorum to do business, compelling the attendance of absent members,
punishing members for disorderly behavior, expulsion of members, and adjournment; but
it says nothing about punishment for contempt.
68. The first attempt by Congress to respond in an official way to contumacious
conduct occurred in 1795. It arose out of an alleged bribery of certain members of the
House by Robert Randall and his chief associate, Charles Whitney. Under authority of a
warrant signed by the Speaker of the House, Randall and Whitney were arrested and
appeared before the bar of the House. Their request to be represented by counsel and for
time to prepare a defense was granted, and the full House considered both direct and
cross-examination testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, the House adopted a
resolution declaring Randall guilty of contempt, resulting in a reprimand by the Speaker
and commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at Arms. He was finally discharged a week
OF CONG.166-230(1795).See C.
later. The Randall-Whitney case is recorded in 5 ANNALS
BECK,CONTEMPT
OF CONGRESS
3, 191 app. (1959).A summary of the major contempt cases
initiated between 1795 and 1943 and a list of all prosecutions from 1944 through 1958 are
set forth in appendixes A and B of C. BECK,supra.
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the legislature such powers would lead to "the total annihilation
of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from
contempts, and [leave] it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate
against it."69The procedure basically involves a resolution by the
affected House of Congress and the subsequent issuance of a warrant signed by its presiding officer. The alleged contemnor is then
arrested by the Sergeant a t Arms. The accused may be represented by counsel, and may be given time to prepare a defense.
The entire House hears the testimony, both direct and crossexamination, and then adopts a resolution as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. If guilt is found, the resolution prescribes
an appropriate p ~ n i s h m e n t . ~ ~
Although the constitutionality of the direct contempt proceeding appears to be well established, there are several reasons
why it is not the most appropriate vehicle for the enforcement of
a congressional inquiry. There is something unseemly about a
House of Congress getting into the business of trial and punishment. Congress is simply not geared to the determination of guilt
or innocence or the meting out of punishment for improper conduct. Though the constitutionality of the direct contempt proceeding has been upheld, there is an uncomfortable similarity
between the direct contempt proceeding and a bill of attainder.
Both involve the legislative branch in determining whether certain conduct should be punished and what punishment is appropriate. It is true that access to the courts is ultimately available
through a habeas corpus proceeding, but a t least in the first instance it is a House of Congress that determines guilt and prescribes punishment. Moreover, in a case involving an assertion of
executive privilege the alleged contemnor is usually a prominent
officer of the executive branch. Use of the direct contempt proceeding in that setting might degrade not only the alleged contemnor, but also government in general, including C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~
69. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821). See also Ex parte Nugent,
18 F . Cas. 471 (C.C.D.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375). Nugent had obtained and given to the New
York Herald a copy of the secret treaty between the United States and Mexico. He was
called to the bar of the Senate and sworn as a witness, but refused to answer questions
concerning his publication. Imprisoned on order of the President of the Senate, Nugent
applied, unsuccessfully, for a writ of habeas corpus.
70. See C. BECK,
supra note 68, at 3-5, 191-95 app.
71. Some scholars evidently do not feel that this approach should be avoided.
This,need not be regarded as unseemly or punitive but merely as the mechanism
that opens the door to judicial review. Once the recalcitrant official is in Congress' custody he can obtain his freedom by filing a petition with a court for a
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Finally, the direct contempt proceeding has been virtually replaced by criminal prosecution for contempt. No direct contempt
proceeding has been brought since 1945.72

B. Criminal Prosecution for Contempt
Prior to 1857 the only means for punishing congressional contempt was the direct contempt procedure. In 1857 Congress established contempt as a statutory crime,73thus shifting to the
courts the major responsibility for determining contempt. Over
the intervening century, the 1857 statute has been modified, but
its basic provisions have remained the same. The current version,
2 U.S.C. § 192, provides:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by
the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or
to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either
House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee
of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the
question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less
than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than
one month nor more than twelve months.74
writ of habeas corpus, which poses the issue of Congress' constitutional power
to insist that the information be supplied.
R. BERGER,
supra note 66, a t 310. But see Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76
COLUM.L. REV.371, 390 (1976):
Either course [the direct contempt procedure or statutory prosecution under O
1941 would be, a t the least, unedifying, the more so when punishment rather
than clarification is sought. It would be an attempt by one branch to assert its
authority by imposing personal sanctions on officials who seek to perform their
duty for another branch equal to the Congress in its responsibility to serve the
people. This is neither the level of statesmanship which created our republic,
nor is it justified by past abuses. Such an attempt would not rectify abuses; it
would supplant them with new ones.
The one arguable advantage of the direct contempt procedure is that there are no
barriers to getting the controversy into court. For reasons set forth in Subsection C, I do
not regard as salutary the absence of such barriers. The principal disadvantage, discussed
above, is that it vests in Congress the initial responsibility for determining guilt or innocence and for imposing punishment. Such functions do not mesh well with congressional
structure or duties. The congressional role is to make general policy, not to determine
individual wrongdoing. Congress' organization and institutional mind-set is oriented toward the achievement of the former, but not the latter.
72. C. BECK,supra note 68, at 7.
73. Act of Jan. 24,1857, Ch. 1 9 , l l Stat. 155 (current version a t 2 U.S.C. 192 (1970)).
74. 2 U.S.C. 4 192 (1970).
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Section 192 is a criminal statute. Therefore, in contrast to direct
contempt procedures, which are the exclusive province of Congress, implementation of section 192 is the responsibility of the
executive branch, carried out by enlisting the machinery, of the
judiciary. Whenever a violation of section 192 is reported to the
appropriate House of Congress, 2 U.S.C. $ 194 provides that the
President of the Senate or Speaker of the House is to refer the
matter "to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty
it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its act i ~ n . "The
~ ~ establishment of a statutory contempt proceeding
did not diminish Congress' direct contempt power; it simply provided Congress with an alternative means of dealing with contempts.'"
Use of the statutory contempt proceeding creates no particular separation of powers problem where the alleged contemnor is
a private party. But it is a different case where the alleged contempt results from a government officer's refusal to give testimony or deliver documents on the ground that the information
sought is subject to an assertion of executive privilege. Referring
that kind of case to "the appropriate United States attorney,"
who by statute has an unqualified obligation to prosecute, places
the Attorney General on the horns of a dilemma. One of the horns
is statutory, the other ethical. The "appropriate United States
attorney" is an officer of the Justice Department. His file leader
is the Attorney General. By statute the conduct of litigation in
which the United States is a party (which would of course include
section 194 suits) is vested in the Attorney General.77Therefore,
the command of section 194 to United States attorneys is also a
command to the Attorney General. But, ethically, the Attorney
General may not be able to obey that command. The assertion
of executive privilege by the President is a weighty and solemn
matter. Before taking such a step, it is virtually certain that the
President will have conferred with his chief legal officer, the Attorney General; indeed, since 1969 this has been a formal requirement by presidential d i r e c t i ~ eHaving
.~~
consulted the President
-

--

75. Id. § 194.
76. "[Tlhe purpose of the statute was merely to supplement the power of contempt
by providing for additional punishment." Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970).
78. In 1969 President Nixon issued the following memorandum:
The policy of this Administration is to comply to the fullest extent possible with
Congressional requests for information. While the Executive branch has the
responsibility of withholding certain information the disclosure of which would
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about the assertion, the Attorney General could not then ethically
bring an action against the President or one of the President's
subordinate officers in connection with a matter on which the
Attorney General earlier gave his advice as a lawyer.79
The statute, however, permits no exceptions: the case is certified to the United States attorney, "whose duty it shall be to
bring the matter before the grand jury for its action."80 Utilizing
the statutory procedure in a n executive privilege case would
therefore force the nation's chief legal officer either to refuse to
obey an unqualified statutory command or to bring a criminal
prosecution against one whose sole criminal conduct consists of
obedience to a Presidential order, in connection with which the
be incompatible with the public interest, this Administration will invoke this
authority only in the most compelling circumstances and after a rigorous inquiry
into the actual need for its exercise. For those reasons Executive privilege will
not be used without specific Presidential approval. The following procedural
steps will govern the invocation of Executive privilege:
1. If the head of an Executive department or agency (hereafter referred to as "department head") believes that compliance with a request for information from a Congressional agency addressed to his
department or agency raises a substantial question as t o the need for
invoking Executive privilege, he should consult the Attorney General
through the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice.
2. If the department head and the Attorney General agree, in accordance with the policy set forth above, that Executive privilege shall
not be invoked in the circumstances, the information shall be released
to the inquiring Congressional agency.
3. If the department head and the Attorney General agree that the
circumstances justify the invocation of Executive privilege, or if either
of them believes that the issue should be submitted to the President,
the matter shall be transmitted to the Counsel to the President, who
will advise the department head of the President's decision.
4. In the event of a Presidential decision to invoke Executive privilege, the department head should advise the Congressional agency
that the claim of Executive privilege is being made with the specific
approval of the President.
5. Pending a final determination of the matter, the department head
should request the Congressional agency to hold its demand for the
information in abeyance until such determination can be made. Care
shall be taken to indicate that the purpose of this request is to protect
the privilege pending the determination, and that the request does not
constitute a claim of privilege.
R. Nixon, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Establishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance with Congressional Demands for Information
(Mar. 24, 1969).
79. "A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing
RESPONSIBILITY
EC 5-15 (19%). "No one could
interests . . . ." ABA CODEOF PROFESSIONAL
conscionably contend that the same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defendant in an adversary action." Id. n.19 (quoting Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transportation
Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958)).
SO. 2 U.S.C. 5 194 (1970).
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Attorney General was consulted, and whose issuance he probably
co~nseled.~~
Referring section 194 cases involving executive privilege to a
special prosecutor would not solve the problem. A special prosecutor within the executive branch would have some of the same
ethical problems discussed above. Vesting the enforcement of section 192 in a special prosecutor attached to Congress or the courts
would raise other serious constitutional questions since the executive branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to
decide whether to prosecute a case.82
A theoretically possible solution-though not an adequate
one-might be to establish a special prosecutor with powers analogous to those of an independent regulatory agency, appointed by
the President, but not subject to his removal powers. Currently,
the conduct of litigation in which the United States is a
81. The dilemma implicit in statutorily mandating the Attorney General to criminally prosecute conduct which he.has advised in his capacity as a governmental lawyer
arose in 1975 when the problem approached the crisis stage in two cases involving members of the President's Cabinet.
The first case involved an assertion of executive privilege by Secretary Kissinger. The
House Select Committee on Intelligence had subpoenaed "[all1 documents relating to
State Department recommending covert action made to the National Security Council
and the Forty Committee and its predecessor committees from January 20, 1961, to the
REPORTOF THE SELECTC O M M ~ONE
present." HOUSESELECTCOMM.ON INTELLIGENCE,
INTELLIGENCE
C ~ N HENRY
G
A. KISSINGER,H.R. Doc. No. 693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1975). President Ford asserted executive privilege as to these documents. The House
Select Committee then recommended that the Speaker certify its report to the United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia "to the end that Henry A. Kissinger, as
Secretary of State, may be proceeded against in the manner and form provided by law."
Id. a t 2. In subsequent briefings the information was supplied to the committee, and as a
result Chairman Pike reported t o the House t h a t "substantial compliance has been
achieved" and by unanimous consent the committee's report recommending contempt
proceedings was recommitted. 121 CONG.REC.39730 (1975).
The second case arose a t about the same time. On Nov. 11, 1975, the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee voted to recommend to the full committee that Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton
be cited for contempt for refusing to deliver t o the subcommittee documents concerning
compliance by American companies with the Arab boycott. Secretary Morton's position
was not based on executive privilege, but was grounded in part on a n opinion from the
Attorney General that the subcommittee was not entitled to receive the reports in question
unless, in exercising the discretion granted him by 4 7(c) of the Export Administration
Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(c) (1970), the Secretary determined that withholding them
would be contrary to the national interest. Once again, crisis was averted through negotiation, this time on the eve of a full committee vote. See Contempt Proceedings Against
Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C. B. Morton including Hearings and Related Documents
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975).
82. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 454 (1869); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965).
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party-which of course includes criminal litigation-is vested in
the Attorney General." This could be changed by statute. There
is at least some question, however, whether a function located as
close to the core of executive responsibility as enforcement of a
criminal statute could constitutionally be vested in an entity possessing an element of insulation from the executive branch comparable to the independent regulatory agencies. Moreover, as a
matter of practical policy and politics, it is highly doubtful that
Congress would create a special prosecutor with such independent powers in order to solve a problem that exists only in theory,
and has never ripened into an actual prosecution in spite of the
fact that the statute has been in existence for almost a century
and a quarter.
The best solution would be to interpret the mandatory language of section 194 as inapplicable to executive privilege cases
or any other cases in which the allegedly contumacious conduct
consists of obedience to legal advice given by the Attorney General. Although on its face the statutory language permits no such
exception, and there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress thought about this problem, it is certainly not
an unreasonable interpretation in light of the wrenching effect
that a literal reading of section 194 would have on separation of
powers problems and the Attorney General's ethical responsibilities. The scope of this exception would be limited, and nonapplicability of section 192 within such a limited sphere does not offend basic notions of fair play. At issue is not the general power
of the executive branch to punish violations of criminal statutes
by persons within the executive branch. The Justice Department
clearly possesses and exercises that power. But when the only
alleged criminal conduct of the putative defendant consists of
obedience to an assertion of executive privilege by the President
from whom the defendant's governmental authority derives, the
defendant is not really being prosecuted for conduct of his own.
He is a defendant only because his prosecution is one way of
bringing before the courts a dispute between the President and
the Congress. It is neither necessary nor fair to make him the
pawn in a criminal prosecution in order to achieve judicial resolution of an interbranch dispute, a t least where there is an alternative means for vindicating congressional investigative interests
and for getting the legal issues into court.
-

83. 28 U.S.C. 5 516 (1970).
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There is such an alternative: a civil suit to enforce a congressional subpoena ordering delivery of the desired information. Assuming a continuation of congressional declination to use its direct contempt powers, this is the only feasible vehicle by which
conflicts between congressional investigative powers and Presidential assertions of executive privilege can be resolved.

C. Civil Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas
Even though civil enforcement is the preferred route to the
resolution of executive privilege-congressional subpoena disputes
(assuming the failure of negotiation), such a procedure also raises
constitutional questions. Does the initiation of a civil suit by
Congress constitute a usurpation of the executive's law enforcement function? Does a federal court have jurisdiction to decide
the issue? And, assuming that the court has jurisdiction, is the
issue justiciable? The law enforcement and jurisdiction issues are
discussed in this Section, while the broader justiciability issue is
discussed in Section IV.
1. Congressional suit as law enforcement

The constitution declares that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."84The Supreme Court reaffirmed, in Buckley v. Valeo, that the executive responsibility
includes bringing litigation to implement federal policy: "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to
the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution
entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. 11 § 3."" One issue that must be faced, therefore, is whether a civil suit to enforce a congressional subpoena is
an unconstitutional usurpation of the executive's law enforcement responsibility. Analogies can be drawn to direct contempt
proceedings, the constitutionality of which has been upheld. On
one hand, civil action, unlike direct contempt, requires the filing
of a lawsuit enlisting the federal judicial machinery in the vindication of congressional interests. In this sense civil action involves
an element of enforcement not present in direct contempt cases.
On the other hand, while either civil enforcement or direct contempt proceedings may be used to obtain information, direct contempt involves the infliction of punishment for offenses against
84. U.S.CONST.art. 11, Q 3.
85. 424 US. 1, 138 (1976).
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a governmental entity. In this respect direct contempt bears a
closer resemblance to law enforcement than does a civil proceeding to enforce a subpoena.
The controlling consideration, however, is that civil enforcement suits, like direct contempt and unlike bills of attainder or
law enforcement, generally are brought for the sole purpose of
vindicating internal congressional prerogatives, not enforcing
criminal statutes or other laws or policies of the United States. A
civil proceeding to enforce a subpoena is not a suit "vindicating
public rights"s6 or implementing official federal policy; seen in
that light, such a proceeding is not forbidden by the Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo. Additionally, it has been held that a
Congressman has a right to sue in his representative capacity as
a Congressman to enforce rights inherent in his position, and from
this right a congressional power to bring civil enforcement suits
can be extrapolated. Kennedy v. Sampsons7held that because of
his interest in protecting the effectiveness of his vote, Senator
Kennedy had standing to challenge an attempted "pocket veto"
of a bill for which he had voted. Similarly, in Mitchell v. Lairds8
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that a Congressman had standing to challenge executive action
taken in prosecuting the war in Indochina without congressional
approval. While standing is a separate issue from separation of
powers, the constitutionality of civil enforcement actions would
seem to follow a fortiori from the holding in Kennedy and
Mitchell. In those cases lawsuits were initiated by individual
members of Congress, and the courts entertained them even
though they involved vindication of public policy because the
suits related to the performance of their duties as Congressmen.
If individual Congressmen can sue, certainly Congress itself can
authorize a similar remedy, so long as the suit is for vindication
of interests internal to Congress, and not for enforcement of general national policy.8g
86. Id. at 140.
87. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353
L. REV.1632
(D.D.C. 1976); Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV.
(1977); Comment, Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive Action, 122 U . PA. L.
REV.1366 (1974); Note, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALEL.J. 1665
(1974).
88. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.936 (1974) (holding that a Congresswoman did not have
standing to obtain an injunction against United States participation in military activities
in or over Cambodia).
89. The court of appeals in its first AT&T opinion observed: "It is clear that the
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2. Jurisdiction

Another impediment to a civil enforcement action is federal
court jurisdiction to entertain it. The only authority on the subject to date is the district court's opinion in Senate Select ComIn that
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Ni~on.~O
case Judge Sirica held that such jurisdiction is not supported by
any general jurisdictional statute. Senate Select Committee was
a suit by the Senate Select Committee and its chairman, Senator
Ervin, to compel compliance with two subpoenas: one seeking
certain tapes, and the other requiring the production of certain
documents and other materials the committee considered relevant to its investigation. The plaintiffs "deliberately chose not to
attempt an adjudication of the matter by resort to a [criminal]
contempt proceeding . . . or via Congressional common law powers which permit the Sergeant at Arms to forcibly secure attendance of the offending party."Q1
Four jurisdictional bases were urged by the plaintiffs: 28
U.S.C. 9 1345" (suits by the United States as plaintiff), 28 U.S.C.
9 1361g3(suits in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer of
the United States to perform his duty), 5 U.S.C. $9 701-706Q4
(the
Administrative Procedure Act), and 28 U.S.C. 9 1331g5(the
"federal question" jurisdictional statute). Judge Sirica rejected
all four grounds: section 1345 because 28 U.S.C. 9 516 "reserves
to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice authority
to litigate as United state^,"^^ the mandamus statute because
"the Court cannot in good conscience hold that any duty defendant may have as President is 'plainly defined as preemptory,' " ~ 7
and the Administrative Procedure Act because "the rule in this
Circuit precludes use of this Act altogether as an independent
basis of jurisdiction."" Federal question jurisdiction was unavailable because the case was not "capable of valuation in dollars and
cents"" and thus failed to satisfy the requirement that the
House as a whole has standing to assert its investigatory power, and can designate a
member to act on its behalf." 551 F.2d at 391.
90. 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
91. Id. at 54.
92. (1970).
93. (1970).
94. (1970).
95. (1970).
96. 366 F. Supp. at 56.
97. Id. at 57.
98. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 59.
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amount in controversy exceed the sum or value of $10,000. Since
"[nlo jurisdictional statute known to the Court, including the
four which plaintiffs name[d], warrant[ed] an assumption of
jurisdiction,"loOthe action was dismissed.
While the appeal in the Senate Select Committee case was
pending, Congress passed a special statute conferring jurisdiction
on the District Court for the District of Columbia over any civil
action brought by the Senate Select Committee "to enforce or
secure a declaration concerning the validity of any subpoena."lol
After the new statute took effect, the court of appeals remandedlo2
the case to the district court which ruled against the committee
on other grounds.lo3An appeal was taken only as to the subpoena
seeking the tapes, but the court of appeals did not reach the
jurisdictional issue. lo4 .
The solution to the jurisdictional problem in Senate Select
Committee may seem to suggest that it would be advisable to
enact a general statute conferring jurisdiction on federal courts
over all civil suits to enforce congressional subpoenas.lo5Disputes
over congressional subpoenas typically involve issues of
law-issues that touch on the most fundamental powers of two
branches of government. Does it not follow that disputes of such
magnitude should be regularly resolved by the third branch,
whose powers are not directly at issue and whose core functions
include interpretation of the laws and the Constitution and the
resolution of disputes?
100. Id. a t 61.
101. Act of Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736 (1973).
102. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498
F.2d 725, 727-28 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
103. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F.
Cir. 1974) (ruling on the subpoena requestSupp. 521 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C.
ing the tapes); id. a t 522 n.1 (ruling on the subpoena requesting the documents).
104. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
105. Indeed, somewhat comparable legislation has been proposed. During the 93d
Congress, a bill was introduced containing the following provision:
The District Court for the District of Columbia shall have original, exclusive
jurisdiction for any civil action brought by either House of Congress, a joint
committee of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress with
respect to any claim of executive privilege asserted before either such House or
any such joint committee or committee.
Hearings Before the Subcornm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations and the Subcomms. on Separation of Power and Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 53435 (1973) (S. 2073, § 1364). A companion section of the bill authorized any Senate, House,
or joint committee to bring suit to contest claims of executive privilege. Id. a t 536-37 (4
3103).
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On balance, I think not.
There is an observable reluctance on the part of both the
article I and article I1 branches to submit issues for resolution by
the third branch that go to the core of their respective constitutional authority. This may be due in part to interbranch territorial instincts or to a residual discomfort over some of the implications of Marbury v. Madison.lo6Whatever the reason for this
reluctance, the result contributes to good government. Notwithstanding the judiciary's final authority in matters of constitutionality, all three branches are concerned with constitutional issues
which they are called upon to resolve as a regular part of their
duties. Moreover, it is in the interest of each branch individually-and in the interest of the nation as a whole-that disputes
concerning overlapping or allegedly inconsistent powers conferred
by article I and article 11be resolved, if possible, by the branches
whose powers are implicated. This is not only because negotiated
settlements are usually more effective than litigation in accommodating the competing interests of both sides,lo7whether in the
government or nongovernment context. It is also because there is
something of an inverse relationship between the effectiveness of
article 111's heavy artillery for dispute resolution and the frequency of its use. Particularly in areas involving conflicts over
interbranch powers, saving the judiciary for the few cases in
which Congress and the President are absolutely unable to resolve
their own differences will sharpen the issues that must go to litigation and will magnify respect for the judicial decision in the
rare case in which it must be rendered.
Recognition of the superiority of a negotiated settlement over
a judicially imposed settlement appears to be an underlying
premise of the court of appeals' approach in both of its opinions
in United States v. AT&T. The facts of that case illustrate the
correctness of the premise. The competing interests of the two
branches in AT&T were, on the one hand, the need to protect
foreign intelligence secrets, and on the other, the need for information relevant to possible legislation. The depth and breadth of
those needs are matters that lie peculiarly within the expertise of
the executive and legislative branches. The extent to which the
provisions of a judicial decree might adversely affect these or
other important governmental interests are also peculiarly within
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
L. REV.371,385-86
107. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
(1976); Comment, United States v. AT&T:Judicially Supervised Negotiation-and Political Questions, 77 COLUM.
L. REV.466 (1977).
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the ken of the disputants. While the approach taken by the court
of appeals in AT&T does not mesh nicely with traditional judicial
forms or procedures, it does combine judicial creativity and flexibility with the fundamental values of judicial restraint. The portions of the second opinion dealing with the steps that the district
court is to take in implementing the court of appeals' decision
demonstrate the essentially nonjudicial aspects of the task.lo8The
skills that this opinion requires of the district court are more the
skills of the mediator, or even the manager, than the federal
judge. And yet, just as the court of appeals' approach is characterized by creativity and flexibility, it also achieves the fundamental values of judicial restraint. There was a dispute between
parties to a lawsuit. Based upon applicable precedents, the court
correctly held that it was a justiciable case or controversy under
article I11 of the Constitution. The court discharged its responsibility to resolve the controversy by utilizing its judicial power
only to the minimum extent necessary, leaving the maximum
opportunity for the parties before it-its sister branches of government-to apply their own superior knowledge concerning their
own peculiar needs. This is the essence of judicial restraint.
Ironically, then, it is not in the interest of good government
to make it easier for two coordinate branches to have differences
over their respective constitutional powers readily resolved by the
third. Accordingly, enactment of a statute generally conferring
federal court jurisdiction over the enforcement of congressional
subpoenas would not be in the public interest. Such disputes are
best resolved by ad hoc enactment of narrow jurisdictional statutes such as the Senate Watergate Committee obtained. Direct
punishment should be left in its present dormant state, and 2
U.S.C. 8 194 should be used only for non-executive-privilegecases
which do not confront the Attorney General with the dilemma
discussed above. With the only avenue for judicial relief in executive privilege-congressional subpoena confrontations requiring an
act of Congress, the pressure on both sides1OQ
to reach a negotiated
settlement will be just about right-not insuperable, as the Senate Watergate Committee experience shows, but nevertheless sufficient to provide real incentive.
The preferability of negotiation over adjudication as a means
108. 567 F.2d at 131-32. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
109. In one sense, the "pressures" are greater on Congress, because the disputed
information is in the possession of the executive branch. It is Congress, however, that can
elect judicial resolution as an alternative to a negotiated settlement by enacting a jurisdictional statute.
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of settling interbranch disputes is also fundamental to the issues
of the justiciability of such disputes. These issues are the subject
of Section IV of this Article.

IV. JUSTICIABILITY
OF EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGECONGRESSIONAL
SUBPOENA
CONFLICTS
Whether a conflict between a President's exercise of executive privilege and a congressional assertion of investigative power
is a justiciable "case or controversy"110that the federal courts are
authorized by article 111 to adjudicate depends principally on
whether such an issue is a "political question." In 1958, when the
reach of the political qbestion doctrine was far broader than it is
today, no lesser an authority than Judge Learned Hand expressed
the view that such a dispute between two branches of government
was a clear example of a nonjusticiable constitutional question.lll
The leading case dealing with the political question issue,
Baker v. Carr, 112 contains a general statement that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship
to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.' "113 Judicial accommodation of the doctrines of executive privilege and
congressional subpoena power fits rather neatly within the
Court's general description, "the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government."
Necessarily, however, any time the federal courts are called upon
to determine the scope of the constitutional authority of a coordinate branch, "the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government" is involved. On
several occasions over the past half century, the Court has been
required to make decisions having the effect of allocating authority between the legislative and executive branches. A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States114and Panama Refining
110. See U.S. CONST.art. III, 4 2, cl. 1. In earlier years a dispute between Congress
and the executive might have been thrown out of court on the grounds that the same
party-the United States-cannot be both plaintiff and defendant. The Gray Jacket, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 342, 371 (1866) (Treasury Department could not ordinarily oppose the
Attorney General). In recent years, however, the courts have entertained intergovernmental suits. See, e.g., United States ex re1 Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S.
153 (1953); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944). See also R. BERGER,
supra note 66, a t
313-20.
111. L. HAND,THEBILLOF RIGHTS15-18 (1962).
112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection challenges t o legislative apportionment were justiciable).
113. Id. a t 210.
114. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
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Co. u. Ryan115involved allocations of constitutional power between the Congress and the President where there was no dispute
between the branches. Buckley u. Valeo, llVoungstown Sheet &
Tube Co. u. Sawyer,l17 United States u. Louett,"* Humphrey's
Executor u. United States,llQand Meyers u. United States120all
involved, in one form or another, issues of allocation of authority
between Congress and the President that the third branch was
called upon to resolve. These are the clearest kinds of cases involving "the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government."
Baker v. Carr also described some of the characteristics
"[plrominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question."121 They are,
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.122

The "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
- --

-

powers portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President to
approve "codes of fair competition").
115. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down the "Petroleum Code" of the National Industrial Recovery Act as excessive delegation of legislative powers to the executive).
116. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that Congress may not appoint federal executive
officers, in this case, members of a federal elections commission; the power to appoint
officers of the United States is an article II executive power and the Constitution prohibits
Congress from performing that function).
117. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating a Presidential order nationalizing the steel
industry as a usurpation of the lawmaking authority of Congress).
118. 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (invalidating as a bill of attainder a provision of an appropriation bill requiring that no funds could be used to compensate three named government
employees).
119. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that Congress could limit the President's power to
remove members of the Federal Trade Commission, an independent regulatory agency).
120. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that Congress could not constitutionally prohibit the
President from removing executive officers).
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969),another prominent political question case,
dealt solely with the issue of congressional power asserted with respect to internal congressional affairs, and did not implicate the powers of the executive branch.
121. 369 U.S. a t 217.
122. Id.
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for resolving" the issue and the "impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion" would appear particularly descriptive of executive
privilege-congressional subpoena confrontations. In the few instances in which federal courts have faced such issues, however,
they have decided them. A conflict between a congressional subpoena and a Presidential assertion of executive privilege was involved in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon. 123 Neither the court of appeals nor the district
court opinions in that case discussed justiciability, but both
courts reached the merits. Necessarily, therefore, both held the
case j~sticiab1e.l~~
Although the Senate Select Committee decisions were rendered prior to Eastland's very deferential treatment of congressional activities,121the same conflict between executive privilege
and congressional investigations was involved in United States v.
AT&T and, in that case, both courts held it justiciable. The court
of appeals dealt at length with the justiciability issue in its second
opinion. The court first noted that the Constitution did not commit the resolution of the issue to either branch.126It then rejected
both the executive's claim that the "Constitution confers on the
executive absolute discretion in the area of national security"127
and Congress' claim that the speech or debate clause prevented
l ~ to
~ the question whether
judicial interference with its a ~ t i 0 n s .As
the court should abstain for lack of "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," the court concluded that negotiations
-

123. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This appeal involved only the subpoena seeking
disclosure of certain tape recordings. No appeal was taken from the district court's earlier
order quashing a subpoena seeking certain records and documents. See notes 102-04 and
accompanying text supra.
124. Judge Wilkey took the position that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question; however, because that conclusion was foreclosed by the court's earlier holding
in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973)' he concurred in the court's opinion. 498 F.2d at
734 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
125. See notes 44-58 and accompanying text supra.
126. 567 F.2d a t 126.
127. Id. at 128. The court noted that the Constitution confers powers related to
national security upon both the President and Congress, and that "the question of allocation of powers associated with foreign affairs and national security" falls within a "zone
of twilight" in which the President and Congress share authority. Id.
128. Id. at 128-29. In refuting Congress' claim that the speech or debate clause immunized congressional action from judicial interference, the court relied upon Senate Select
Committee and the Eastland Court's observation that in prior cases the Court had balanced congressional investigatory powers against first amendment rights. Id. at 129. See
note 51 supra.
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between the parties had "largely obviated this problem by bringing into sharper focus the needs of the parties."ln
The Court in United States u. Nixon observed in connection
with the justiciability argument in that case that "[iJn the Constitutional sense, controversy means more than disagreement and
conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve."130 If "the kind of controversy courts traditionally
resolve" means historic judicial practice and not just frequency
of occurrence, it would seem quite clear that United States v.
Nixon also supports the view that article 111 authorizes judicial
resolution of disputes concerning allocation of authority between
the article I and the article I1 branches.131The instances in which
such disputes have reached the courts have been rare. But when
they have, the courts historically have resolved them, as illustrated by the cases discussed above.
The controversy in Nixon was between two officials of the
executive branch. Other things being equal, the case for justiciability of an intrabranch dispute is harder than that of a dispute
between coordinate branches of government. Most of the criteria
prescribed by Baker v. Carr-including particularly "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion" and "the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question"lJ2-are clearly more pronounced
when the dispute involves only a single branch. Disagreements
between two executive departments or two committees of Congress would seem clearly nonjusticiable under the Baker v. Carr
guidelines and under the dictates of common sense. In an intrabranch dispute there is a final, nonjudicial authority over the
disputants (the President or the congressional leadership) and
the controversy should be resolved within the branch in which it
arises. Even so, United States v. Nixon and Powell u.
129. 567 F.2d at 127.
130. 418 U S . at 696.
131. Professor Archibald Cox takes a different view as to the meaning of this phrase:
But the Chief Justice probably meant to limit these sentences by the preceding
sentence which points out that the evidence whose production is sought and
resisted is "deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in
a pending criminal case"-an element that satisfied the need for the "kind of
controversy courts traditionally resolve."
Cox, Executive Rivilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV.1383, 1423-24 (1974) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
132. 369 U.S. at 217.
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M c C o r m a ~ kwere
~ ~ ~both intrabranch controversies that were held
justiciable. In those cases, however, the concept of an intrabranch
final authority was inapplicable because the President in Nixon
and the congressional leadership in McCormack were parties to
the disputes. Moreover, there is serious question whether United
States u. Nixon would have been justiciable absent the regulation
delegating authority "to represent the United States in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and
tenure ."ls4
Professor Cox argues that "[tlhe absence of a material private stake in the outcome may prove . . . important"ls5 to the
justiciability issue. He points out that in Schechter Poultry, Panama Refining, Meyers, Humphrey's Executor, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube, and Louett "[elach of the . . . cases was brought by or
against a state or a private person who had a material stake in
the outcome."136By contrast, he points out, "[tlhe named parties in an action to enforce a subpoena against a claim of executive privilege might be the Congress or a congressional body and
the President."ls7 It is probably true that there will be some kind
of private stake in the outcome in most cases (other than executive privilege-congressional subpoena conflicts) wherein the underlying issue concerns the distribution of power between two
branches of government. This was true in Powell u. McCormack,
as well as in the cases cited by Professor Cox. It was technically
true in United States u. AT&T, though the interest of the telephone company in that case was only a formal one.ls8 But, the
presence of a private stake in the outcome of interbranch disputes
should have no bearing on justiciability. No more important
questions come before federal courts than how the Constitution
distributes power among the branches of government. The com133. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
134. 418 U.S. at 694 (footnote omitted).
135. Cox, supra note 131, a t 1423.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Professor Cox seems to argue that even in United States v. Nixon there was
something like a private controversy. Id. a t 1423-24. He finds significant the language of
the opinion describing the evidence a t issue as "deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be
relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case." 418 U.S. a t 697. In my view, the
interest of the special prosecutor did not impart to United States v. Nixon "a material
private stake in the outcome." However his peculiar relation to the executive branch is
defined, the special prosecutor was clearly an officer of government and an officer of the
executive branch. He was performing functions that no one outside the executive branch
could constitutionally perform. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 138 (1976). And his interest
in the litigation rested exclusively on his official governmental responsibilities.
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parative magnitude of the relevant governmental interests do not
vary in the slightest according to whether some private party also
has a stake in the outcome. Therefore, the existence or nonexistence of private interests should be irrelevant to the justiciability
question.
A characteristic of executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases that arguably cuts against justiciability is that withholding judicial relief will not result in failure of resolution. The
case will usually be resolved by the President's deciding to comply or not comply with the subpoena. While the President is an
elected officer and is presumed to act in the public interest, this
approach is not at all satisfactory because it commits the resolution of the dispute to one of the disputants.13QMoreover, where,
as in AT&T, the documents at issue are in the possession of a
private corporation, a holding of nonjusticiability shifts the effective decisional authority, not to a governmental entity, but to a
corporation which has neither an interest in the dispute nor any
reason to have considered-much less weighed-the competing
governmental values.
There is another characteristic-unique to executive
privilege-congressional subpoena cases-which, taken alone,
makes the case for justiciability of such disputes more difficult
than in other instances where the judiciary is called upon to resolve competing claims to constitutional authority by its sister
branches. For reasons discussed in Section V below, the preferable method for judicial resolution of executive privilegecongressional investigation conflicts is to have the courts balance
the competing interests without creating a presumption in favor
of either. Admittedly, that kind of balancing will significantly
involve the federal courts in reexamining underlying policy
choices in substantive areas quite clearly committed to one or
both of the other branches of government. It is, however, the
alternative that is most consistent, both in theory and in application, with underlying separation of powers precepts. In this respect, the issue of justiciability is closely linked to the final issue
139. The court of appeals in its second AT&T opinion stated:
Where the dispute consists of a clash of authority between two branches, however, judicial abstention does not lead to orderly resolution of the dispute. No
one branch is identified as having final authority in the area of concern. If the
negotiation fails-as in a case where one party, because of chance circumstance,
has no need to compromise-a stalemate will result, with the possibility of
detrimental effect on the smooth functioning of government.
567 F.2d at 126.

272

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

to be discussed by this Article: If federal courts are constitutionally empowered to resolve confrontations between assertions of
executive privilege and exercise of congressional investigatory
powers, by what standards should they perform that task? The
final discussion of justiciability will therefore be deferred and
considered in connection with the issue of appropriate judicial
standards.

One approach to constitutional law is to divide the entire
field into two broad components. The first deals with the powers
of government, state or federal, and the second with the protection of individual interests against the exercise of those governmental powers. The lines separating the two are not always rigid.
The diffusion of power and authority among the three branches,
as well as between the national and state governments, helps to
assure against arbitrary infringement of individual rights by lessening the concentration of power in any one group, and by setting
off some governmental entities as checks and balances against the
powers of others.
This view of constitutional law as divisible into two broad
categories is helpful in determining the proper standards by
which federal courts should decide cases involving conflicts between executive privilege and congressional investigations. Such
conflicts fall within the realm of the first category of constitutional law, the powers of government. Determination of the proper standards for resolution of these conflicts, however, is aided
by examination of the judicial struggles and the results of those
struggles in connection with the second category, the protection
of individual interests against the exercise of governmental powers.
In attempting to achieve a constitutional accommodation of
governmental-societal and individual interests, the courts have
used a single overarching approach. That approach has been to
balance in some fashion the competing sets of interests-those of
the individual, and those of society (as determined by society's
elected legislative representatives). Not all of the opinions describe their approach as involving balancing, and in most cases
the balancing has not been evenhanded in the sense that the
inquiry is usually not whether the interests on the one side or the
other preponderate. Rather, the courts generally inquire into
whether the interests on one side are sufficient to overcome a
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predetermined weighting favoring the other. But it is a balancing approach in the sense that the conflicting interests of the
individual and society are reconciled by taking into account in
some fashion the comparative strengths of those conflicting interests in each particular case. Indeed, the only alternative to some
kind of balance between governmental and individual interests is
an absolutist, per se approach, which would prescribe that in
certain contexts either the legislative decision will always be
honored or the constitutionally recognized individual rights will
always be protected. While the absolutist approach has been advocated in cases involving individual versus societal interests,140
it has rarely if ever been followed.
The question has not been whether to balance, but how.
Some of the most important issues over the long range of our
experience with constitutional adjudication have concerned the
weighting of the balance scales either in favor of the individual
or the government. This weighting is not that which results from
a consideration of the merits of the individual case, but rather
that which occurs before the court reaches the merits for all cases
of that kind, so that in the particular case one side or the other
will have more than a fifty-fifty burden to overcome.
In areas where there have been a substantial number of cases
involving a conflict between governmental and individual interests-including the first amendment, equal protection, due process, and the commerce clause-this pre-merits weighting has
occurred. Some of the most important developments in American
constitutional history have centered on whether the weighting
should favor government or the individual. In determining the
constitutionality of state-imposed burdens on interstate commerce resulting from exercises of the police power, the balance
scales were at one time weighted heavily in favor of the legislative
judgment.141 The weighting probably still favors state government, though not as much as before.'" In cases involving the first
140. Its most vigorous advocates in recent years have been Justices Black and Douglas, who have argued for such an approach in favor of government in commerce clause
cases, see, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 789 (1945) (Black, J., dissent& W. HELLERSTEIN,
STATEAND
ing); id. a t 795 (Douglas, J., dissenting); J. HELLERSTEIN
LOCAL
TAXATION,
250-51 (4th ed. 1978), and in favor of the individual in first amendment
cases, see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U S . 36,64-74 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.865, 867, 875-81 (1960). See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). On the general issue
,
CONSTITUTIONAL
of the absolutist versus the balancing approach see L. T R ~ EAMERICAN
LAW 582-84 (1978).
141. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
142. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959): "These safety
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amendment and other "fundamental" rights, the pre-merits
weighting favors the individual.lh3In substantive due process
cases, individual interests, both economic and noneconomic, were
given a heavy preference for many years.144
At least as to economic
matters this has now been reversed, and the judicially imposed
weighting favors the g~vernment;"~
indeed, the opinions in some
cases even suggest an absolutist standard.146As to certain noneconomic matters, the eradication of the earlier substantive due
process approach is less clear.14' In equal protection cases the
general rule has been for many years,'" and still is,'" that the
state may distinquish among persons or classes so long as the
distinction is not irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate
state objective. Two exceptions have been rather firmly established, however. If either (1) the classification itself falls into a
"suspect" category,150 or (2) the individual interest affected is
" f ~ n d a m e n t a l , "the
~ ~ ~weighting is reversed and the balance
scale, prior to consideration of the merits of the individual case,
is tipped in favor of the individual. Thus, the consistent judicial
approach to cases constituting one of the two broad components
of constitutional law-the accommodation of individual and govmeasures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court." Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,770 (1945): "There has thus been left to the states wide scope
for the regulation of matters of local state concern, even though it in some measure affects
the commerce."
143. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
144. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
145. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
146. Fergusson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,731 (1963): "Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments
are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 487 (1955): "The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement."
147. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S . 479 (1965). See also Constitutional Law Symposium: Allocation of Policymaking Authority Between Court and Legislature, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
37.
148. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U S . 552 (1947).
149. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976).
150. The categories which have been defined as "suspect" include race, alienage, and
national origin. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). But see Foley v.
Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978) (holding that limiting state police appointments to U.S.
citizens does not violate equal protection rights of aliens).
151. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
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ernmental interests-has been to balance and to identify in advance of the balance which set of interests is to be preferred.
In those cases involving conflicts between governmental interests and individual interests, there are sound theoretical and
practical reasons for pre-merits weighting of the balance scales.
The practical reason is that cases calling for a choice between
competing interests are easier to decide if the court is called upon,
not to decide which of the two is in fact heavier, but whether one
is sufficiently heavy to overcome a predetermined handicap. The
theoretical support for a pre-merits weighting of governmentalversus-individual-interests cases is that the competing interests
are of different quality and come from readily distinguishable
sources. With the governmental set of interests being rooted in a
legislative judgment and the individual set of interests in the
Constitution, good arguments can be made for preferring either.
The basic argument for weighting the scale in the individual's favor is that his position is based on the Constitution and
is therefore entitled to greater weight than his opponent's competing claim based on a statute. As Hamilton observed in No. 78
of The Federalist, "If there should happen to be an irreconcilable
variance between [the Constitution and a statute] that which
has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be
preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute."lJ2 This familiar statement is probably the
best contemporary support for the argument that judicial review
was contemplated by the original Constitution-makers. Its underlying and undisputed premise-the superiority of the Constitution over legislative acts-also provides a theoretical basis for a
general pre-merits weighting in favor of individual interests.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the legislature
should have the scales tipped in its favor, since the competing
considerations underlying all legislative judgments involve issues
of public policy. The accommodation of competing policy interests is the single most important responsibility of legislative bodies. Legislators, like judges, are sworn to uphold the Constitution,
and to the extent constitutional issues are involved, these will be
taken into account by the legislators in making the final choices
among policy alternatives. Therefore, the argument runs, though
legislators' decisions should not be immune from judicial review,
their judgments should be given deference.
For present purposes, the important point is not which of
152. THEFEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 492 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
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these positions is more persuasive, or whether what the court has
in fact done-giving the preference to the state in some contexts
and to the individual in others-is in accord with sound constitutional principles. The important point is that there is a sound
theoretical basis for giving a preference either way, and good
practical reasons for doing so.
There is a difference between this kind of case and executive
privilege-congressional subpoena cases, however. Executive
privilege-congressional subpoena cases involve questions of the
constitutional allocation of power among coequal branches of the
federal government, rather than protection of constitutionally
based individual interests against the exercise of governmental
powers. The conflict in first amendment, fourteenth amendment,
and commerce clause cases is between governmental and nongovernmental parties. The claim of one is based on the Constitution,
and the other on the judgment of the legislature in matters of
public policy choice. By contrast, in executive privilegecongressional subpoena cases, the conflicting interests are rooted
in the same source and are of the same general type. The dispute
is between two of three coordinate branches of the federal government, each of which bases its claim on a grant of power contained
in the United States Constitution.
In selecting the appropriate standard for deciding executive
privilege-congressional subpoena conflicts, the courts have three
basic choices. They are:
(1.)An absolute, per se rule, under which the interests of one
of the branches will always prevail, regardless of the comparative
strengths of the parties' positions in the case.
(2.) A balancing approach similar to that employed in the
governmental interests versus individual interests context, assigning a predetermined preference either to congressional subpoena power or executive privilege.
(3.) A true, evenhanded balance, weighing the impact of alternative outcomes on the underlying objectives of both executive
privilege and congressional investigations without any pre-merits
weighting.
These three alternatives for judicial resolution of executive
privilege-congressional subpoena cases will now be considered,
including, as to each, an examination of its supporting authority
and the theoretical and practical implications of its adoption.
These alternatives assume that the substance of the controversy
is to be resolved by the courts. The alternative of resolution by
another branch (by hypothesis one of the parties to the dispute),
the policy and constitutional issues posed by that alternative,
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and its similarities to the absolutist approach will also be considered in connection with the examination of the alternative standards.

A.

The Absolutist Standard

There are three basic arguments favoring adoption of an absolutist approach. The first is that it is simple to apply. Second,
it yields consistent, predictable results with consequent planning
benefits to government and nongovernment individuals and institutions. The third argument is similar to the position that executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases are not justiciable:
either of the other approaches necessarily involves the judiciary
to some degree in a reexamination of the underlying policy considerations made by one or both of the other branches in issuing
the subpoena or asserting executive privilege. These are matters
that are not only "committ[ed] . . . to a coordinate political
department,"153they lie a t the very core of the responsibilities of
the other branches.
The strongest support for vesting final decisional authority
in the Congress comes from Professor Cox, who would vest that
authority in either House of Congress that considers the matter.
Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit have advocated that the President
should have that authority.

Professor Cox and absolute deference to Congress
In the subsection of his article on executive privilege entitled
"Modern Need to Invest the Court With Enforcement Jurisdiction," Professor Cox reviews three developments that in his view
"furnish persuasive evidence of a need to increase the power of
Congress to compel the President and others in the executive
branch to produce information."ls4 He then proposes the following:
I.

These trends probably make it desirable to put the force of
law behind some congressional subpoenas addressed to the President, his aides or other executive officials. Ideally, I think, the
legislative right should prevail in every case in which either the
Senate or House of Representatives votes to override the Executive's objections, provided that the information is relevant to a
153. Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. at 217.
154. Cox, supra note 131, at 1432.
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matter which is under inquiry and within the jurisdiction of the
body issuing the subpoena, including its constitutional jurisdiction. A single committee or subcommittee, because it offers little guaranty of restraint, is the greatest threat to the values of
confidentiality and carries the great danger of oppression. The
very need for a vote of an entire chamber would not only provide
a forum in which the Executive's arguments could be fairly
considered, but the uncertainty of the outcome would press all
concerned to negotiate a resolution. A vote of the entire Senate
or House of Representatives is required to cite a private person
for contempt. The requirement has proved useful in the past. If
either House did vote to require the information, the President
should have no constitutional right to withhold it and the Judiciary should not go behind the voted demand except to decide
questions of relevance and jurisdiction. This would avoid the
difficulty of developing nonpolitical, judicial standards of decision and thus would meet the chief constitutional objection to
other legislative pr0posa1s.l~~

Under Professor Cox's proposal, the judicial role would be
limited to deciding the threshold questions of relevance and jurisdiction. Any issues concerning the conflicting policy demands of
the legislative and executive branches would presumably be left
to the final decision of the particular House of Congress, as would
the persuasiveness of the executive's arguments, which are to be
"fairly considered."
2. Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey and absolute deference to the
President

The positions of Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey are set forth
in separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part
from the en banc per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Nixon v. Sirica. 15@At issue in
Nixon v. Sirica was an order entered by District Judge Sirica to
enforce a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directing President
Nixon to produce certain tapes and documents. The legality of
Judge Sirica's order was challenged by both the President and
also the special prosecutor, then Mr. Archibald Cox. Because of
serious questions concerning its jurisdiction to consider the special prosecutor's petition under the "all writs" statute,15' the
155. Id. at 1434. See also P. KURLAND,
WATERGATE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
130 (1978).
156. 487 F.2d 700, 729-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 762-99 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
157. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
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court exercised its discretion to consider only the President's petition.lJ8
Having asserted executive privilege with regard to the items
sought by the grand jury, President Nixon's counsel contended,
inter alia, "that Executive privilege is absolute with respect to
presidential communications, so that disclosure is a t the sole discretion of the President."lJgThe majority rejected the President's
argument that the privilege is absolute, observing that throughout history "there have frequently been conflicts between independent organs of the federal government"lWand that "[wlhen
such conflicts arise in justiciable cases, our constitutional system
provides a means for resolving them-one Supreme Court."lM In
response to the contention that the President's position was sustained by the doctrine of separation of powers, the court responded that "[tlo leave the proper scope and application of
Executive privilege to the President's sole discretion would represent a mixing, rather than a separation of Executive and Judicial
function^."^^^
In place of absolute deference, the majority applied a
weighted balancing test, discussed further in Subsection B,with
the pre-merits presumption favoring the executive. The court
observed that "such conversations are presumptively privileged"lu but held that the presumption "must fail in the face of
the uniquely powerful showing made by the Special Prosecutor in
this case."lB4
Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey wrote separate opinions and
each concurred in the other's opinion. Judge MacKinnon's opinion contains a lengthy and scholarly review of the history of Presidential assertions of executive privilege and an analysis of some
of the relevant Supreme Court opinions, from which he concludes
there is a sound basis for "an absolute, evidentiary privilege for
conversations and deliberations of the President with his close
advisors," and further that "the privilege also has constitutional
dimensions."Ia5
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. 4 1651(a) (1970).
158. 487 F.2d at 706-08.
159. Id. at 708.
160. Id. at 715.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 717.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 750 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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In Judge Wilkey's view, the issue in the case was as follows:
The Per Curiam here never confronts the fundamental Constitutional question of separation of powers, but instead prefers
to treat the case as if all were involved was a weighing and
balancing of conflicting public interests. There are conflicting
public interests involved, they must be carefully weighed, balanced, and appraised; the President says he has done just that.
Therefore, the most fundamental, necessarily decisive issue is,
Who Does [sic] the weighing and balancing of conflicting public interests? The District Judge or the President? The answer
to this question necessarily involves the Constitutional question
of separation of powers.166

Addressing the issue "Who decides?" Judge Wilkey concluded:
I thus reach the conclusion, differing from the majority of
my colleagues, that the privilege asserted by the President here
derives both from the Constitutional principle of separation of
powers and from the common sense-common law, statutory
privilege of confidentiality of Governmental decision-making,
whatever the Branch. The latter may be subject to weighing and
balancing of conflicting public interests, as many of the cases
have done, but never in a case involving the President as a
party. But where the privilege of the Chief Executive is derived
from the Constitutional principle of separation of powers, it is
no more subject to weighing and balancing than any other Constitutional privilege can be weighed and balanced by extraneous third parties.
Every President, beginning with Washington and Jefferson,
has asserted that the privilege and the scope and applicability
are for him alone to decide. This is precisely what Congress does
when it either grants or withholds documents in response to the
request of a court for evidence in a criminal case. This is what
no doubt this court would do if confronted with a demand by a
Congressional committee for any of our internal documents. We
would weigh and decide and assert the privilege as we saw it,
not as a Congressional committee would see it. W e would do so
on the Constitutional ground of separation of powers. And this
is what the President has done here.lB7

Nixon u. Sirica did not involve a conflict between executive
privilege interests and congressional investigative interests.
While there was no confrontation of executive and legislative
branch prerogatives, there was a straight confrontation between
166. Id. at 763 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 773-74 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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the judiciary and the executive.168Thus, Judges MacKinnon and
Wilkey contended for absolute deference to the Presidential judgment in asserting executive privilege against the judiciary. There
is no reason to conclude they would take any other position visa-vis Congress. Moreover, in his concurring opinion in Senate
Select Committee o n Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, la which involved a confrontation between congressional
investigative power and executive privilege, Judge Wilkey referred to his opinion in Ninon v. Sirica as taking the position that
actions challenging Presidential assertions of executive privilege
are nonjusticiable.170
The positions taken by advocates of the absolutist approach
demonstrate the close linkage between the issues of justiciability
and the substantive standards by which courts should resolve the
dispute. If the judicial decision on the merits runs in favor of the
executive, then in the majority of cases the net effect will be the
same as if the court held either that (1)the case is not justiciable,
or (2) even though justiciable the courts should withhold judicial
relief as a matter of prudence. In the typical executive privilegecongressional subpoena case it is Congress that needs affirmative
judicial action because the executive has possession of the documents. If the courts do not act, that possession remains unaffected, and the executive wins. The result is the same if the courts
decide the case, but defer absolutely to the executive. Thus, it
should not be surprising that the opinions of the two principal
advocates of absolute deference to the executive judgment,
Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey, do not sharply distinguish between issues of justiciability and substantive standards for decision. Rather, they concentrate on the propriety-as a matter of
history, policy, and good constitutional adjudication-of leaving
the final judgment to the President. Similarly, while Professor
Cox's view is that ultimate resolution should be left to a full vote
of the appropriate House of Congress, it is not clear whether his
position is (1) that Congress should pass a statute authorizing
such a procedure, and the courts should hold the statute constitutional; (2) that absent such a statute, courts should hold that
since another branch of government is better suited to resolve
168. The tapes were to be examined in camera by the district judge "and the grand
jury may never see or hear any of them after the District Judge's review in camera. " Id.
at 788. As a consequence, "the Judiciary-Executive confrontation is there at the outset,
whatever the character of the grand jury." Id.
169. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
170. Id. at 734 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
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such disputes the courts will refrain from decision and will if
necessary enforce the judgment of the House of Congress when
made; or (3) that if a House of Congress has passed on the issue,
courts should refrain from taking any action. As in the case of the
positions taken by Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey, any of these
views results in shifting the real decisional authority from the
courts to another branch of government.171

B. Weighted Balancing
Three federal judicial opinions have considered on the merits
square conflicts between a Presidential assertion of executive
privilege and a congressional subpoena. They are the district
court's and court of appeals' opinions in Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, and the district
' ~ least
~
two of the
court opinion in United States v. A T ~ c T .At
three opinions (and perhaps all three) have applied a weighted
balancing standard, with the pre-merits weighting favoring the
President. This is the only approach, therefore, that is clearly
supported by a majority opinion of a federal court.
The Senate Select Committee case was a suit by the Ervin
committee seeking access to five tape recordings of conversations
between President Nixon and John Dean. The committee had
served a subpoena duces tecum on the President, who responded
by asserting executive privilege. On the first go-around of attempted judicial enforcement, Judge Sirica ruled that the district
court lacked jurisdiction. Congress thereupon passed a special
statute giving the district court jurisdiction to enforce the select
committee's subpoenas.174In the subsequent enforcement action
the district court (Judge Gesell) dismissed the complaint without
prejudice. Whether he gave any pre-merits weight to the assertion
of executive privilege is not clear from the opinion. On the one
hand, the opinion made the observation that "[ilt has not been
demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction that the Committee has
a pressing need for the subpoenaed tapes or that further public
hearings before the Committee concerning the content of those
171. If shifted to a House of Congress, this will mean that the legislative branch wins.
There may, however, be some occasions when a House of Congress would decide to deny
to one of its constituent committees the information requested from the executive branch,
but this would rarely occur.
172. The district court opinion is reported at 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1974) and the
court of appeals opinion at 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
173. 41.9.F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C.),modified, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
174. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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tapes will at this time serve the public interest."175On the other
hand, the concluding paragraph stated that "while the controversy presented is justiciable, the Select Committee has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled
at this particular time to an injunction directing the President to
comply with its subpoena for the five tape recordings."17s
By contrast, the court of appeals in the Senate Select
Committee case quite clearly followed a weighted balancing approach. That court held applicable the same basic approach that
it had followed in Nixon u. Sirica: a generalized assertion of executive privilege by the President is "presumptively privileged,"17'
and the presumption can be overcome "only by a strong showing
of need by another institution of government-a showing that the
responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be fulfilled
without access [to the documents sought]."178Thus, the court of
appeals in Senate Select Committee ( 1 ) adopted as the governing
rule a weighted balancing approach with the presumption favoring the Presidential assertion of privilege in cases involving conflicts between congressional subpoenas and assertions of executive privilege based on confidential communications; (2) relied as
precedent on its earlier ruling in Nixon v. Sirica, thus suggesting
that the same standard is applicable whether the Presidential
assertion conflicts with fundamental functions of either of the
other branches; and (3) rejected the district court's opinion insofar as it followed a contrary approach.17gBy the time the case
reached the court of appeals, the House Committee on the Judiciary had begun its inquiry into Presidential impeachment. Under
these circumstances, the court held that "the Select Committee
has failed to make the requisite showing"i80 because its
"immediate oversight need for the subpoenaed tapes is, from a
congressional perspective, merely cumulative." lgi With regard to
the weight of the burden, the court observed that the committee
had not shown that "the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably
--

-

175. 370 F. Supp. at 522 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
177. 498 F.2d at 730.
178. Id.
179. The "apparent understanding" of the district court opinion which the court of
appeals rejected was probably the district court's failure to weight the scales in the President's favor. Id.
180. Id. at 731.
181. Id. at 732. With regard to congressional oversight, the opinion observed, "In the
circumstances of this case, we need neither deny that the Congress may have, quite apart
from its legislative responsibilities, a general oversight power, nor explore what the lawful
reach of that power might be under the Committee's constituent resolution." Id.
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critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions."lU2
The court of appeals opinion in Senate Select Committee v.
Nixon was issued just about a year before the Supreme Court held
in Eastland u. United States Servicemen's Fund that the issuance and enforcement of congressional subpoenas are included
within the speech or debate clause immunity. United States v.
AT&T is the only post-Eastland case to consider on the merits a
square conflict between executive privilege and congressional
subpoena power. The magnitude of the conflict was sharpened by
the fact that the asserted executive interest was the protection of
foreign intelligence secrets, an area of Presidential responsibility
in which the United States Supreme Court declared in United
States v. Nixon that "courts have traditionally shown the utmost
deference." lm Moreover, the congressional interest in A T&T was
enforcement of a subpoena, held by Eastland to be included
within speech or debate, and the Eastland opinion had declared
that "the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are abso1ute."lR4
While the formal parties in United States v. AT&T were the
United States (the executive branch) as plaintiff and AT&T as
defendant, the telephone company had no interest in the outcome
of the suit, filed no pleadings, and neither briefed nor argued any
of the issues. The position adverse to that of the President was
vigorously advanced by the intervenor and the real party in interest, Chairman Moss, who initially appeared on behalf of himself,
and later on behalf of the entire House of Representatives. Chairman Moss took the absolutist position that the judicial inquiry
should end with a determination that the subpoena was issued for
a legitimate legislative purpose. The district court rejected this
view and stated that the appropriate test was to balance the
competing interests:
The Court accepts the position of the intervenor that the
subpoenaed materials are sought pursuant to a legitimate legislative investigation. Contrary to the intervenor's argument,
however, the Court's inquiry cannot conclude a t this point. The
legislative authority to investigate is not absolute. In our system
of government the Constitution is supreme, but no one portion
of the Constitution is sacrosanct. Here, the nature, the extent
182. Id. at 731.
183. 418.U.S.at 710.
184. 421 U.S.at 501.
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and the relative importance of the power of one coordinate
branch of government must be balanced against that of the
other. Neither can be considered in a vacuum.185

The district court listed three factors it felt should appropriately be taken into account in affecting the balance: (1) "whether
the information requested is essential to 'the responsible fulfillment of the committee's functions,' Senate Select Committee v.
Nixon, . . . 498 F.2d 725, 731 (1974)"; (2) "whether there is 'an
available alternative' which might provide the required information 'without forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege,'
United States u. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 . . . (1953)"; and (3)
"the circumstances surrounding and the basis for the Presidential
assertion of privilege. [United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. a t
111; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 . . . (1974)."lM
As to the first two factors, the court commented that "[tlhe
helpfulness of the national security request letters in determining
the basis on which the wiretaps were instituted is minimal."ls7
However, the backup memoranda, even though subject to deletion of specific information, would "ostensibly afford the Subcommittee relevant information upon which to determine
whether the wiretaps were instituted for foreign intelligence surveillance rather than domestic surveillance and to make the determination as to whether new legislation should be drawn."ls8
With regard to the third factor, the court observed:
[Tlhe President has determined that release of the material
would present an unacceptable risk of disclosure of the most
sensitive national security and foreign policy matters. The possible effect of such disclosure has been detailed above. Such a
determination by the Executive is generally accorded great
deference by the courts.189

The court's final conclusion was as follows:
[Ilf a final determination as to the need to maintain the secrecy
of this material, or as to what constitutes an acceptable risk of
disclosure, must be made, it should be made by the constituent
branch of government to which the primary role in these areas
185. 419 F. Supp. at 459.
186. Id. at 460.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974); United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
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is entrusted. In the areas of national security and foreign policy,
that role is given to the Executi~e.'~o

The same considerations discussed above as supporting an
absolutist approach also support the position that if the court is
to balance the interests of one branch against those of another,
pre-merits weighting is better than a straight balancing. It is
easier, it yields more consistent and predictable results, and it
requires lesser judicial involvement in policy matters clearly committed to another branch. Weighted balancing also has the support of the limited judicial precedents dealing with the issue. The
conceded materiality of these considerations notwithstanding,
they are insufficient to carry the day. They bear more heavily on
justiciability and on the wisdom of the court of appeals' efforts
in the AT&T and Nixon v. Sirica cases to achieve a negotiated
settlement than on the standards for judicial decision.
I believe that the preferred approach is an evenhanded balancing with no pre-merits weighting. Unlike the other two approaches, it has been advocated by neither judicial nor scholarly
opinion. Some of the reasons why it is the best approach are
closely linked to the issue of justiciability. Accordingly, the final
Subsection of this Article will discuss my views concerning justiciability (discussed earlier in Section IV) and nonweighted balancing as the appropriate standard for judicial resolution of executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases.

C. Justiciability and Nonweighted Balancing
I.

Justiciability

All three opinions that have resolved on their merits conflicts
between executive privilege and the congressional subpoena
power-the district court and the court of appeals in Senate Select Commit tee and the district court in A T&T-have necessarily
held that such conflicts are justiciable. The court of appeals'
second opinion in AT&T also held such disputes justiciable, thus
providing the basis for its creative attempts to achieve a negotiated solution, if possible, and for its ultimate disposition of the
merits of the case, if necessary.
190. Id. at 461. This case demonstrates that the three standards suggested
above-absolute deference, weighted balancing, and straight balancing-may shade into
each other. Judge Gasch's final paragraph, quoted above, suggested that in carrying out
his stated purpose to balance the competing considerations he may have weighted the
scales so heavily in the executive's favor that the end result was absolute deference to the
President's decision, the approach advocated by Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon.
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The arguments against justiciability, discussed in Section IV
above, highlight the problems that result from judicial attempts
to resolve confrontations between executive privilege and congressional investigative power. If the appropriate judicial standard is to balance without a pre-merits weighting, judicial resolution will not only involve consideration of matters that are
"committ[ed] . . . to a coordinate political department;"lgl in
the usual case courts will be required to reevaluate the policy
judgments reached by the other branches. Moreover, in the usual
executive privilege-congressional subpoena case, these policy
judgments are not only central to the other branches' constitutional duties; they are also judgments that the other branches are
much more qualified to make.
What this counsels, however, is not that executive privilegecongressional subpoena cases are nonjusticiable, but rather that
courts should follow the lead of the court of appeals in AT&T:
decline to reach the merits in such suits until all reasonable efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement have been exhausted.
Manifestly, the parties understand better than the courts which
aspects of their positions can be compromised without working
serious damage to their own particular needs and to important
governmental objectives. Moreover, because of the case or controversy limitation on judicial fact finding, courts lack the finetuning capability to achieve through judicial decree a resolution
that would serve the competing interests as well as would a negotiated compromise. It is therefore consistent with article 111's case
or controversy limitation, as well as with basic separation of powers principles, for courts to afford the parties to interbranch disputes every reasonable opportunity to achieve-and sometimes
pressure them toward achieving-a compromise, prior to and as
a precondition of judicial resolution.
It must be recognized, however, that even the most creative
judicial efforts to maximize the opportunity and the incentive for
a negotiated settlement will not always bear fruit. While it is in
the interest of good government to have the disputant branches
resolve their own differences if they can, it is not in the interest
of good government to leave the dispute unresolved. Indeed, leaving such disputes "unresolved" does not really leave them unresolved. A holding of nonjusticiability means victory for the defendant; in most executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases
this will be the President. The conflict in these cases is real and
191. Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. a t 217.
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the stakes are high; the relevant issues are central to governmental functions. Such issues deserve consideration on the merits
rather than decision by default. It is unthinkable, for example,
that the dispute in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyerlg2-a
pure vanilla dispute over the respective powers of Congress and
the President-should have been left unresolved.
It is therefore necessary that there be a final decisional authority. Such authority should-and does-rest with the courts.
The issues in interbranch controversies concern the interpretation of the Constitution for the purpose of settling disputes between disagreeing parties. Both the resolution of disputes and the
declaration of constitutional doctrine are the traditional province
of the judiciary. And whatever the difficulties or potential improprieties posed by the federal judiciary's attempting to resolve
such disputes and fashion an appropriate remedy, they are certainly no greater than in legislative apportionment or busing
cases. Judicial resolution of interbranch disputes should be a last
resort. But in those rare cases where judicial resolution is necessary, decision of such cases on the merits is not only consistent
with the case or controversy limitation of article 111, it is the most
important thing federal courts do.
2.

Nonweighted balancing: the preferred judicial approach

Just as courts should avoid deciding executive privilegecongressional subpoena cases as long as there is any reasonable
possibility that judicial efforts to induce a negotiated settlement
may be successful, a court faced with the necessity of deciding
such cases should apply a rule of decision that recognizes the
equality of its sister branches of government who are the litigants
in its courtroom. The standard that achieves maximum fidelity
to this objective is a straight balance with no pre-merits weighting given to either side.
As discussed above, an absolutist standard would be the easiest to apply and would yield the most consistent and predictable
results. But it is a standard that places the judiciary in the position of having to decide which of its sister branches is to receive
such automatic and inflexible favor at the expense of the other.
That kind of judicial decision is unseemly, unwise, and inconsistent with sound separation of powers theory. A fundamental
premise of separation of powers theory is that even though each
branch enjoys spheres of activity within which it is supreme, in
-

192. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

-

-
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their interbranch relationships and in the status to which each is
entitled before other branches, all are equal. This is especially
true when the position of each branch in a litigated interbranch
dispute is solidly grounded on settled constitutional principles.
An absolute, never-changing preference of one of these positions
over the other regardless of the circumstances of the individual
case is inconsistent with the premise that each branch is equal
in its relationships with other branches.
Based perhaps on notions of separation of powers, there is a
decided and understandable judicial reluctance to reexamine a
policy judgment made by a coordinate branch within its own
particular sphere of responsibility. For example, in support of his
"Who decides?" approach in Nixon v. Sirica (and his conclusion
that the one who decides is the President), Judge Wilkey reasons,
"There are conflicting public interests involved, they must be
carefully weighed, balanced, and appraised; the President says he
has done just that."lg3Judge Wilkey's conclusion is:
Thus, the real issue, even by the analysis in other parts of
the Per Curiam opinion, is whether it is appropriate for the court
to determine the legal validity of a claim of privilege by the
President, or whether the Constitutional principle of separation
of powers requires the court to yield to the President's judgment
as to where the public interest lies. My answer would be the
latter.lB4

The final paragraph of District Judge Gasch's opinion in
United States v . AT&T states the same basic approach:
The Court is not implying that the members of the Subcommittee, or of the House of Representatives, will act negli193. 487 F.2d 700,763 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
The foregoing analysis assumes, for reasons set forth and discussed in text accompanying
notes 168-70supra, that Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon would apply the same rationale
as contained in their Nixon v . Sirica opinions to a controversy involving conflicting prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches. In any event, the analysis set forth above
is also applicable to the dispute in Nixon v. Sirica, since the conflict there was between
the powers of the executive and judicial branches. Arguably, the hardest case for justiciability of interbranch conflicts and for the application of a nonweighted balancing approach
occurs in those cases where one of the branches involved in the interbranch conflict is the
judiciary. In such cases, the courts act, in a sense, as judges of their own case. Notwithstanding this conceptual concern, the conclusions reached in the text are equally applicable where judicial powers are in conflict with those of another branch. The underlying
premise of the "rule of necessity," Evans v. Gore, 253 U S . 245, 247-48 (1920); Atkins v.
United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1040 (Ct. C1. 1977), is that when there is no other alternative, judicial decision of cases in which the judiciary may have an institutional interest
poses lesser net drawbacks than leaving important issues, particularly constitutional issues, unresolved.
194. 487 F.2d a t 794 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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gently or in bad faith if they have access to these documents.
But it does appear to the Court that if a final determination as
to the need to maintain the secrecy of this material, or as to
what constitutes an acceptable risk of disclosure must be made,
it should be made by the constituent branch of government to
which the primary role of these areas is entrusted. In areas of
national security and foreign policy, that role is given to the
Executive. lg5

This reluctance to reevaluate the policy judgments of another branch is appropriate in the vast majority of contexts. Indeed, on many issues within areas of exclusive executive or legislative responsibility, the judicial standard ought to be nothing
less than absolute deference.lg6But that kind of approach breaks
down where the interests on both sides of the conflict are supported by policy determinations made by officials of two separate
branches of government, each acting in his own particular sphere
of governmental responsibility. Judge Wilkey is right: The President has balanced the competing national interest considerations. He has done so in the exercise of his constitutional responsibilities, and he has reached a final conclusion. If the President
were the only governmental entity and if his decision were the
only public policy judgment involved in the litigation, then absolute deference or something approaching it would be the appropriate standard. But where the litigated interests in conflict with
those of the President are also supported by a policy judgment
made by a coequal branch of government, the supporting rationale for absolute deference is missing and the absolutist approach
is inappropriate.
Professor Cox's position that "the legislative right should
prevail in every case in which either the s i n a t e or the House of
Representatives votes to override the Executive's objections"lg7
suffers from the same defect. His assurance that "[tlhe very
need for a vote of an entire chamber would . . . provide a forum
in which the Executive's arguments could be fairly considered"1g8
might or might not be realized in any given case. A fair forum
notwithstanding, vesting the final decisional authority over disputes between the Congress and the President with either of the
195. 419 F. Supp. at 461.
196. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
197. Cox, supra note 131, at 1434.
198. Id.
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disputants is still fundamentally unfair and the unfairness strikes
at the very roots of coequality and separation of powers.
The district court in AT&T concluded
that if a final determination as to the need to maintain the
secrecy of this material, or as to what constitutes an acceptable
risk of disclosure, must be made, it should be made by the
constituent branch of government to which the primary role [in
the areas of national security and foreign policy] is entrusted.lgg

There is a parallel, equally persuasive article I-based position
that if a final decision as to the need of these materials for legitimate legislative purposes-and the ability of a subcommittee to
adequately safeguard them-must be made, it should be made by
the constituent branch of government to which the primary responsibility for policymaking is entrusted.200Thus, litigation involving interbranch conflicts places the court in a genuine theoretical dilemma. Choosing between the conflicting positions of
sister branches and reviewing the substance of policy decisions
made by those branches are not the kinds of functions that courts
perform best. But the alternatives are even worse: adopting the
absolutist approach and thus yielding automatically in every case
to the judgment of one branch and rejecting that of the other; or
simply staying out of the matter, which necessarily results in a
de facto holding in favor of one branch or the other.
A weighted balancing approach is also inappropriate for the
resolution of executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases.
When the competing interests requiring judicial resolution are
those of society on one hand and the individual on the other, there
are both practical and theoretical reasons for giving a preference
to one set of interests.201There is no adequate basis for such a
distinction, however, when the competing interests are those of
199. 419 F. Supp. at 461.
200. Indeed Chairman Moss took just such a position. His first brief before the court
of appeals states:
The plain mandate of existing judicial authority . . . makes clear that the
responsibility of courts in a case such as this is limited to a determination of
whether Congress is acting within its jurisdiction, as opposed to usurping powers
exclusively vested elsewhere. Conversely, those authorities make abundantly
clear that, having made such determination, the principle of separation of powers precludes the courts from substituting their judgment for that of Congress
as to the specific need for particular information that Congress seeks in a course
of a valid legislative investigation.
Brief for Intervenor-Appellant a t 49-50, United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (first opinion), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (second opinion).
201. See text following note 151 supra.
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coordinate branches of government and when both sets of interests are rooted in the Constitution.
While there are other possible arguments for preferring one
set of interests over another, they fall short of justifying a premerits weighting in favor of either the legislature or the executive.
In favor of Congress it might be asserted that congressional investigative powers fall under the speech or debate immunityM2which
is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution while executive privilege is only implied. Although a true statement, it is unpersuasive
for several reasons. First, even though the Constitution expressly
provides for speech or debate immunity, it does not expressly
extend such immunity to the issuance and enforcement of congressional subpoenas. Second, the Court has not traditionally
assigned a higher constitutional value to express rights and principles than to implicit ones and is not likely to do so. The premier
power and function of the federal courts, judicial review, is implicit rather than express. Some of the individual rights that the
Court has held to be "fundamental," such as the right to travelzo3
and various aspects of the right of privacy,204must be inferred
from more explicit provisions.
For the executive, it might be argued that a decision by the
President, in whom all article I1 authority is vested, does not
really stand on the same footing as a decision by a single committee of one House of Congress (or in some cases, a single subcommittee or subcommittee chairman, vested with authority to issue
subpoenas). This argument also is insufficiently persuasive. The
functioning of each branch within itself and the level of approval
that must be obtained before official action is to be taken are
matters internal to that branch, as long as the requirements of
the Constitution are met. Even if one were to assume that the
Constitution requires such symmetry that the decision of a President is under all circumstances to be preferred to that of a congressional committee or subcommittee, the needs of such conceptual symmetry would be satisfied by the fact that the reason
subpoenas ccn be approved by the action of a committee, subcommittee, or a chairman is that the entire House of Congress has
arranged its internal structure to permit such a procedure.
Finally then, these two postulates remain: (1)Each branch
enjoys primary responsibility and authority over certain govern202. See notes 44-58 and accompanying text supra.
203. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
204. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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mental functions (lawmaking, law enforcement, and law interpretation, including judicial review). Nevertheless, in their interbranch relationships, in the deference that each branch owes to
the other two, and in the standing that each enjoys before the
others, the three branches are equal. (2) It is fundamentally inconsistent with that principle of coequality for the judiciary to
resolve cases or controversies involving competing constitutionally based claims of the other two branches by according absolute
deference to the judgment of either. It is equally inconsistent with
coequality for the courts to hold such a case nonjusticiable
(thereby effecting the same net result as absolute deference) or
to employ a balancing approach that weights the balance scales
in favor of one branch or the other.
Thus, the remaining alternative is a genuine balancing approach without any predetermined preference for either side, with
the victor to be determined on the basis of a simple preponderance of relevant considerations. This approach will be the most
difficult of all possible judicial approaches and will provide the
least predictable results. Since executive privilege-congressional
subpoena controversies so rarely call for judicial resolution, however, and since the governmental stakes involved are so large,
judicial ease and predictability do not seem as important as in
other contexts.
Whenever an executive privilege-congressional subpoena
case comes before a court, both parties will have already made
certain judgments and reached certain conclusions. In the AT&T
case, for example, the subcommittee had determined that access
to the leased line letters was necessary to the subcommittee's
oversight function and to enable it to determine whether amendments to the Communications Act should be enacted. On the
other side of the balance scale was the President's determination
that compliance with the subpoena would involve unacceptable
risks of disclosure. In attempting to achieve a balance between
these two competing determinations, there are several levels of
possible judicial reevaluation of underlying policy judgments,
and concomitantly, judicial intrusion into substantive policy
areas committed to other branches.
The first level, involving the least judicial intrusion, would
be for the court to acceptthe correctness of the judgments made
by each of its sister branches and-taking these judgments as
correct-balance the one against the other. Because it involves
less judicial intrusion into the affairs of the other branches, this
would be the preferable approach, provided that it would satisfactorily resolve the case. I suspect that in many executive
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privilege-congressional subpoena cases, however, i t will not.
Applying such an approach to the facts of the AT&T case, it
might be contended that the President's determination has a
broad sweep involving detriment "to the national defense and
foreign policy of the United States and damag[e] to the national
security." Accepting this determination a t full value, it has a
greater impact on national interests than the oversight of one
subcommittee and consideration of the possible need to amend
section 605 of the Communications Act. This is an unduly formalistic kind of analysis, however, and would simply invite broader
congressional definitions of the legislative investigative purpose.
In AT&T, for example, the purpose of the investigation could
have been described as a determination of the extent to which the
United States government is infringing upon the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of its own citizens. This could have been coupled with a legislative determination that access to the documents was indispensable to the achievement of the legislative
objective. Thus, taking the policy judgments of the respective
branches totally a t face value as articulated by Congress or the
President and attempting to balance them may be a futile exercise.
The level of judicial inquiry a t the opposite extreme would
involve the court in a complete redetermination of the policy
judgments made by the other two branches. In the AT&T case,
reexamination of the underlying legislative policy judgments
would have involved such inquiries as, "Why is this information
really important to the legislative inquiry?" or "What kind of
legislation does the subcommittee have in mind, and how do
these documents bear on that legislation?" A more extreme inquiry-which I assume no court would ever make-would be,
"Are any amendments to section 605 really necessary?" On the
Presidential side, a reevaluating court might ask what the "risks
of disclosure" really are, and why they are "unacceptable." Neither Mr. Moss nor anyone on the subcommittee ever indicated an
intent to disclose anything in the subpoenaed documents. Indeed,
the subcommittee pointed to its own excellent record in maintaining the security of secret information. On what, then, does the
President base his judgment that there are risks of disclosure and
that they are unacceptable? This kind of reevaluation of Presidential decisions could lead the court into other areas which most
courts would quite clearly want to avoid and which in most cases
they should avoid. But, in some cases, certain such questions
might be appropriate for in camera review, such as: What do the
documents really contain? And, why is it that their disclosure
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(assuming that there are risks of disclosure) would be detrimental
to national interests?2o5
In most cases, total judicial abstinence from substantive examination of the competing determinations of the other branches
would provide an insufficient basis for deciding the case, but
complete judicial reevaluation of those judgments would involve
more judicial intrusion than is necessary. There is an intermediate level of judicial inquiry that I believe in most cases will enable
the court to satisfactorily perform its constitutional duty to decide cases or controversies, without unduly intruding into the
constitutional domain of the other branches. In most-possibly
all-executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases the court
could accept as its premise the correctness of the competing policy judgments made by the Congress and the President. It could
then focus on possible alternatives to the withholding or disclosure of the information a t issue, and in the process determine
which alternatives would serve the policy objectives of one of the
branches without significantly diminishing those of the other.
The AT&T case is again illustrative. The President determined that compliance with the subpoena would involve unacceptable risks of disclosure. Without reexamining that judgment,
are there alternative means for protecting against the risks of
disclosure, other than total withholding? Would it be possible to
limit the examination of the documents to a secure place provided by the executive branch, or to limit the number of legislative branch personnel who will make the examination and who
205. There are persons whose general orientation opposes exposure of secret material
to persons outside the executive branch. Certainly, it is in the interest of government and
its citizens to limit the number of persons, no matter how reliable, who have access to
secret information. But, there is no magical linkage between executive branch employment and reliability with regard to secret information. For reasons set forth below, it is
preferable for courts applying a balancing test to executive privilege-congressional subpoena cases to do so at a level that will involve the least possible intrusion into underlying
policy judgments of sister branches, so long as such intrusion minimization can be
achieved without sacrificing the court's ability satisfactorily to decide the case. The
subjective impression born of my personal experience is that courts generally are very
cautious about examining government secrets, and that when such examination has been
necessary, the judicial security record is a t least as good as that of either of the other
branches. It is true that federal judges have not signed-as executive branch personnel
have-a written undertaking not to disclose, and it would be unseemly to ask them to do
so. But they have taken an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. In those few cases
where it may be necessary for a court to conduct a limited in camera investigation of secret
material, including material of the sensitivity involved in the AT&T case, such an examination should be made. The reason that executive branch personnel have access to such
information is that it is necessary to the performance of the governmental responsibilities.
There are circumstances under which the same would be true with the federal judge. In
such a case, the court should make the examination.
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will have access to the results of that study? On the legislative
side, the subcommittee determined that the information contained in the leased line letters is essential to the performance of
its legislative duties of oversight and possible statutory revision.
Accepting the correctness of that determination, are there means
of supplying the information other than providing access to the
leased line letters? Are there other documents whose delivery to
the subcommittee (accepting also a t face value the President's
determination concerning risks of disclosure) would pose lesser
risks, but would be just as helpful or even more helpful to the
committee?
The foregoing questions certainly do not exhaust the alternatives in AT&T, and any executive privilege-congressional subpoena case will present its own unique set of alternative solutions.
What these examples illustrate is that in AT&T the consideration
of alternatives would permit the court to apply a nonweighted
balancing approach at a level that would minimize substantive
reexamination of the underlying policy judgments made by its
sister branches. This should be true in most executive privilegecongressional subpoena cases. The ultimate issue in those cases
will always be whether information should be delivered to Congress, where a component of Congress has decided that it should
be delivered and the President has decided that it should not.
Thus, just as in AT&T and in the Senate Select Committee case
(where the court of appeals considered alternatives to the information sought by the committee and ultimately based its decision on the existence of such alternatives), any executive
privilege-congressional subpoena case should present opportunities for consideration of alternative solutions. The consideration
of alternatives does not completely extricate courts from the business of policy reevaluation, but at the very least, it shifts the
reevaluation to a less intrusive level. In AT&T, consideration of
alternatives could be undertaken without disturbing either the
Presidential judgments concerning the disclosure risks, or the
congressiona! judgments concerning the need for information.
In other contexts, consideration of alternatives has been
In execfound relevant to the resolution of constitutional issues.206
utive privilege-congressional subpoena cases, such an approach
would permit the courts to balance the competing governmental
206. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U S . 349 (1951).
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interests, but with minimal reevaluation of the policy judgments
made by other branches. It would therefore seem to be the approach that best satisfies the judicial responsibility to decide
cases or controversies without undue intrusion into functions that
are equally central to constitutional duties of the other two
branches.

VI. CONCLUSION
The germs of executive privilege and congressional investigatory powers were contained in the 1787 Constitution. Nevertheless, principles for dealing with the interactions between these
two doctrines have only recently begun to emerge.
Probably the least satisfactory judicial approach to the accommodation of the competing needs of these two constitutional
doctrines would be to hold the issue nonjusticiable. Such an approach would in fact resolve the conflict on a general, allencompassing basis, without any opportunity for taking into account the particular characteristics of the individual case.
It is important that courts resolve these or any other conflicts
between Congress and the President in a way that not only decides the case, but also recognizes the equality of the article I and
article II branches as they appear before the article 111 branch.
The only approach that is faithful to this objective is a straight
balance of the competing interests, with no pre-merits weighting.
For this reason it is the preferred approach, even though to date
no court has applied it, and no judge or scholar has advocated it.

